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votes  of the majonty of the current Members 0/ Parha- meetBy letter of 8 f'1ay 1985, the Political Affairs Committee requested permission
to submit a report on the political relations bet\.Jeen the European Community
and the Soviet Union.
By letter of 26 June 1985, the committee was authorised to submit a report on
this issue.
At the sittings indicated below, the European Parliament referred to the
Political Affairs Committee as the committee responsible, pursuant to Rule 63
of the Rules of Procedure, the following motions for resolutions:
on 10 July 1985, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr f~ATTINA on
relations between the European Community and the Soviet Union
(Doc. B 2-558/85) (also asked for an opinion: the Committee on External
Economic Relations),
on 11 November 1985, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs BOOT and
others, on beha lf of the Group of the European People s Party
(Christian-Democratic Group), on the situation of the Jews in the Soviet
Union (Doc. B 2-1041/85),
on 13 January 1986, the motion fM a resolut'ion tabled byMr PORDEA and
others, on Romanian territories annexed by the Soviet Union
(Doc. 8 2- 1198/85),
On 19 November 1985, the committee appointed Mr B. FRIEDRICH rapporteur.
On the latter' sdeath, thecommi ttee appoi ntedMr H_NSCH rapporteur on
4 November 1987.
The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 26 November 1987,
26 January, 25 February, 24 March, 25 and 26 Apri land 25 May 1988. 
12 July 1988, it adopted the mot ion for a resolution as a whole unopposed with
8 abstentions.
The following took part in the velte: Mr Ercini, Chairman; f~r Planas and
Si r Peter Vanneck, Vice-Chai rmen; Mr Hansch, rapporteur; Mr van Aerssen
(deput i zi ng for Mr Pende rs) , Mr Bai llot (deput i zi n9 for Mr Pi quet) ,
Lord Bethell, fllr Beyer de Ryke (deputi zing for Mr Gawronski), Mr Boesmans
(deputi zing for Mrs van den HeuveU, Mr De Gucht ~1r Delorozoy (deputi zing for
Mr Santana Lopez), Mr Ephremidis, Mr Estgen, Mr Falconer (deputizing for
Mrs Charzat), Mr Ford, Mr Graziani (deputizing for Mr Galluzzi), fllr Habsburg,
Mr Hindley (deputi zing for Mr Zagari), Mr van der Lek, Mr McMahon (deputi zing
for Mr Gl inne) , Mr ~'aceratini, Mr D. filartin (deputizing for Mr Lomas),
Mr Medeiros Ferreira (deputizing for ~1r Amadei), fVlr Mertens (deputizing for
Mr Klepsch).. MrMi randa da Si lva (deputi zing for Mrs Trupia) , Mr Nord
(deputizing for Mr Bettiza), Mr Perez Royo, Mr Perinat Elio, Mr PflimLin,
Mr Pirkl (deputizing for f'1r Blumenfeld), Mr Plaskovitis, Mr Pons Grau
(deputi zing for MrMoran Lopez) , Mr Prag (deputi zing for flir Fraga lribarne),
Mr Rothley (deputizing for Mr Newens), Mr Saby, Si r James Scott-Hopkins
(deputi zing for Lord Douro), Mr Seefeld, Mr Sierra Bardaj i (deputi zing for
Mr Verde I Aldea), Mr Toksvig, Mr Topmann (d~puti zing for Mr Walter),
Mr Tzounis, Mr von Uexkull, Mr Welsh and Mr WohCfahrt.
The Committee on External Economic Relations decided not to deliver an opinion.
The report was tabled on 15 July 1988.
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report wi II appear on the draft
agenda for the part-session at which it is to be considered.
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following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement:
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on political relations between the European Community and the Soviet Union
The European Parliament,
having regard to the following motions for resolutions:
- motion for a resolution tabled by Mr MATTINA on relations between the
European Community and the Soviet Union (Doc. B 2-558/85),
- motion for a resolution tabled byMrs BOOT 8I1d others on the situation ,
the Jews in the ~oviet Union (Doc. B 2-1041/85),
- motion for a resolution tabled by Mr PORDEA and others on Romanian
territories annexed by the Soviet Union (Doc. B 2-1198/85) 
having regard to its resolution on relations between the European Community
and the countri es of Centra l and Eastern Europe
(OJ No. C 343, 31. 12.1985, p.92),
having regard to its resolution on relations between the European' Community
and the Counc i l for Mutua l Economi c Ass i stance (CMEA) and the Eastern
European member states of the CMEA (OJ No. C 46, 23. 1987, p. 71),
having regard to its resolutions on human and civi l rights violations in
the Soviet Union and, in particulai' , to its resolution on human rights in
the world in 1985/86 and on Community human rights policy
(OJ No. C 99, 13. 1987, p. 157),
having regard to its resolution on the consequences for the European
Community of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the
Conference on Confidence and Security-Bui lding Measures and Disarmament in
Europe (OJ No. C 190, 20. 1987
, p.
M),
having regard to its resolution on the implementation of the Helsinki
Agreement and the role of the European Parliament in the CSCE process
(OJ No. C 190, 20. 1987, p. 67),
having regard to the report of its Political Affairs Committee
(Doc. A2-155/88)
A. a~Jare of the major importance of the Soviet Union in the shaping of the
future of Europe, because:
- as a European power (in part) , events within that country may, despite
its enormous size, also affect the Community directly, as the nuclear
accident that occurred at Chernobyl in Apri l 1986 demonstrated, since the
effects of modern technology have made ~he world seem smaller
EN(88) 1756E - 5 - PE 119.475/fin.- as a protagonist in European history, it made a decisive contribution to
the destruction of national socialism and fascism in Europe in the Second
World War, which the Nazi regime in Germany had forced on its European
neighbours to the east and ~Jest, fighting alongside the Allies and making
an enormous sacrifice in terms of human life and property, and as one of
the four signatory states to the four-power agreement of
3 September 1971,;- it has rights and responsibi l ities in respect of Berlin
and consequently also within the area in which the Community treaties
apply, in Berlin (West),
.- as one of the centres of an ideology which is part of the political and
cultural h.istory of Europe, but which degenerated during the Stalin era
into a regime of despotism and terror and is rejected in a free vote by
an overwhelming majority of the nations of Europe and North America, it
has contributed in its power politics to the division of Europe and is
seen by the nations of the Community as a threat and a reaSOn fo.
adopting a defensive attitude,
- as the leading power in the Warsaw pact, it denies its allies freedom and
self-'determination and continues to treat them according to the principle
it laid down of ' limitedsovereignty whereby the limits of sovereignty
are not determined freely but imposed by the Soviet Union,
- as the ideological and military rival of Western Europe s ally, the
United States of America", it is not only an adversary but also a
negotiating partner and contracting party with the USA in the concept of
9 loba l mutua l nuc lear deterrence, so that the success or fai lure of
efforts to achieve disarmament and detente and to promote development in
the world depends on its attitude, 
as a power which had no scruples in claiming to incorporate formerly
independent states, it continues to occupy Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
- as a European superpower ", it has influence and security interests on the
European continent which exist independently of the social system in the
Soviet Union and which must be taken into consideration,
B. having regard to the Preambles of the original treaties and of the Single
European Act, according to which the Communities were created as 'the basis
for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody
confl i.cts ' (ECSC Treaty), to ' lay the foundations of an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe' (EEC Treaty) and ' together make their own
contribution to the preservation of international peace and security ' (SEA),
C. convinced that the Community therefore has a duty to activate, extend and
consol idate relations with the Soviet Union in all sectors,
D. regretting that, more than thi rty years after the founding of the
Community, there are sti II no of-ficial relations between the Community and
the Soviet Union because, for a long period, on ideological and political
grounds, the Soviet Union was not prepared to recognize the Community
either as an economic or as a political reality,
EN(88)1756E - 6 - PE 119.475/fin.E. whereas initial attempts to improve relations between the Community and the
Soviet Union were hampered by violations of human and civi l rights in the
Soviet Union and by its military intervention in Central and Eastern Europe
and the Third World, as evidenced most recently in 1968 in Czechoslovakia
and in 1979 in Afghani stan
F. hoping that the Soviet Union wi II give effect to General Secretary
Gorbachev s intimation to the then President-in-Office of the Council..
Mr CraKi , that the Soviet Union i$ ready ~o seek a dialogue with the
Community on practical international issues;
G. resolved to establish normal relations yJith the Soviet Union through its
own constructive policy and to use every opportunity for cooperation to
further mutual interests, promote self-determination for the peoples of
Europe, establish human rights and thereby secure peace in Europe,
I. As regards the politi cat background to the normalization of relations
1. Notes that the basis for the normalization of relations between the
Community and the Soviet Union has improved:
(a) firstly, because of changes in the international climate", especially as
a result of:
the fact that.. in view of the development of armaments in the nuclear
age, war in Europe .would mean the end of European civilization as we
know it,
- the increasing clout of regional powers and nevI groupings of states and
the inherent likelihood of regional conflicts, which are reducing the
significance of the polarization in East-West relations of recent
decades,
- the innovation brought about by modern technologies .\~hich rapidly
change economic and social structures in the industrialized nations,
have positive and negative implications and increase the
interdependence of nations and of Europe in particuLar,
(b) secondly, because of incipient political reforms in the Soviet Union,
thus enabling the Soviet Union to attempt to match the economic
performance of the Western nations, which aim:
i nterna lly:
- to create the conditions required for greater efficiency and
competitivity in the Soviet economy and to overcome stagnation in the
economy and society by new management methods, including
market-oriented features and the stepping up of scientifi c and
technologi cal progress, and
at the same time, to overcome the os~ification of the system by opening
up society, promoting private initiatives'and individual
responsibi lity, greater democratic participation in the appointment of
leaders in the party and the production process and greater
transparency and openness in publ i c life and greater scope for freedom
of opinion,
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- to adapt Soviet policy to new realities (Gorbachev) and to regard
security in Europe as common and indivisible, in accordance with the
resolutions adopted by the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress;
Pays tribute to the efforts of the Soviet Leadership to implement its
programme of economic and poLitical reform but will not base its policy on
any naive belief that rapid and fundamentaL changes will take place;
Is aware, in particular, that the Soviet leadership does not intend to
diverge from or dilute Marxist-Leninist ideoLogy but that its objectives
and principles are to remain vaLid;
Is aware also of the internal problems encountered in the impLementation
of the reform programmes, especiaLLy the cumbersome nature of the Soviet
political system, the stiff resistance in the Soviet Communist Party based
on fear that the system wi II colLapse and personaL advantages be
jeopardi~ed... and the Lack of practice of most Soviet citizens in dealing
with the risks and opportunities of freedom;
Notes that a number of improvements have been made in the field .of human
and civi L rights but nevertheless takes the view th.at the Soviet
Government in no way fuLLy respects these rights;
Calls on the Soviet Union to adopt the legislation required by its
constitution to guarantee the human rights specified in the CSCE FinaL Act
as well as the human rights listed in the United Nations Convention;
Appeals to the Soviet authorities to release all political prisoners and
to allow those citi zens who have expressed such a wish to leave the
country;
Believes that there is a need in the context of the CSCE process t? set up
a mechanism for considering and resolving specific cases of human rights
and assumes that the Soviet Union wi II make a constructive contriblJtion
towards putting this proposal into practice;
Notes that thoroughgoing legal reforms are being prepared in the Soviet
Union as part of perestroika, the declared aim of which is to bring Soviet
legislation into line with and up to the standard of internationaL Law, in
particular to provide stronger guarantees of Soviet citizens ' rights under
the law, to facilitate entering and leaving the country considerably and
to restrict the imposition of the death penalty;
10. Wi LL assess further developments in the Soviet Union on the basis of the
concrete progress made to secure peace for all the nations in Europe,
irrespective of their sociaL system, of respect for basic human and civi 
rights, as enshrined in the CSCE Final Act, and of the incre.ase in freedom
for the CentraL and Eastern European allies of the Soviet Union which
actuaLly results from the Soviet reform policy;
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result of the mi l itary intervention in August 1968 against the movement of
reforms going in the same direction as the present reform of Gorbachev in
the USSR today and therefore asks the USSR to reassess its 1968 position
and to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia;
12. Recogni zes from certai n features of the reform, covered by the terms r Glasnost I and I Perestroi ka  that dynami c forces have been set i nmotion
whi ch a llow Long suppressed and taboo issues to be addressed and also
increase freedom of action for non-governmental g roups and individuaLs;
13. Realizes that the process of reform in the Soviet Union has onLy just
begun and that it wiLL not be possible to make a definitive polit'ical
assessment of it for some time to come; recogni zes therein, nevertheLess,
a number of positive elements in the willingness to impr'ove relations with
the Community on a broad basis, to overcome the self-imposed isolation of
the Soviet Union from the world economy and make it less unattractive as a
t radi ng partner and to cooperate with the Communi ty and the countries of
the Western ALLiance in tackLing security and humanitarian issues;
14. Is convinced therefore that the gradual changes set in train by the Soviet
leadership may also be in the interests of the Community and its Member
States if they actually result in an opening up of the Soviet system
internaLLy and externaLLy;
15. Calls on the Community and its Member States to take every opportunity
resulting from the Soviet reform policy to secure peace and improve
relations with a view to achieving closer cooperation and greater mutual
confidence;
16. Is convinced that, in the nuclear age, East and West bear joint
responsibi l ity for preventing the outbreak of war and that, in the long
term, peace in Europe is based on the premise that all nations may
exercise their right to self-determination and thus, albeit with different
social systems, live in security; 
17. Emphasizes, in t~s ~onnection, that security is not merely based on a
mi l itary ba lance between states and aLLiances but a lso on the stabi l ity of
social relationships within those states, and that there can be no
stabi l i ty where freedom is oppressed i nterna lly and the ba lance between
nations constantly procured afresh with another round in the arms race;
18. Recalls, in this context, the undertakings entered into both by the Soviet
Union and the Community and its Member States in the CSCE Final Act;
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political dimensions of a European security strategy, whereby European
security policy must be based simultaneously on defence and detente, i.
on the one hand, on further disarmament, including asymmetric reduction of
conventional forces, the elimination of chemical weapons and the balanced
reduction of nuclear arsenals, whereby the objective is for each side to
mai ntai n a defensi ve strength no greater than that requi red to act as a
deterrent,
and, on the other hand, on the development of broadly-based cooperation in
the fields of economics, science and technology, environmental protection
and culture in order to create a network of mutual dependencies which
supports security through the interdependence of mutual interests and
makes it reliable;
20. Takes as an encouraging sign of readiness to reach agreement on the
central issues of security and co-existence of the nations of Europe the
statements made at the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress that, in view
f modern technology, European security is ' indivisible
21. Considers that, to thi s end, use should be made of both bi lateral
cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Community and its Member
States aod cooperation under multi lateral agreements and conventions and
all other fora in which both sides participate; 
II. As regards the improvement of relations
in the field of trade, technology and environmental protection:
22. Advocates the conclusion of a comprehensive cooperation and trade
agreement between the Community and the Soviet Union and points out that
it would regard such an agreement as a significant international agreement
ithin the meaning of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure and hence wish to
participate in the negotiations on its conclusion;
23. Stresses that the Community should also conclude comprehensive trade and
cooperation agreements with other European states apart from the Soviet
Union belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON);
24. Is aware that the export of certain goods from the Community is subject to
restrictions, endorses as wide as possible a trade in the field of
advanced technology and supports export restrictions only on goods of real
strategic importance;
25. Welcomes the decisions taken in Paris in January 1988 to cut the COCOM
list and caLLs on the Commission and the governments of the Member States
to use thei r i nf luence to ensure that COCOM lists are further shortened
and, in conjunction with this, that there is greater transparency for
companies and more effective verification of compliance with the
restri ctions;
EN(88) 1756E - 10 - PE 119.475/fin.26. Points out that, to date, trade with the Soviet Union has also been
hampered by that count ry' S poor range of  compet i t i ve manufactured goods
and by certain foreign tr.ade structures which originate in the Soviet
economic and social system;
27. Recognizes, in the economic reforms introduced so far, signs of greater
flexibitity, decentralized decision-making and technological innovations
but considers that more far-reaching measures are necessary to fad l itate
international trade, e.g. the convertibi lity of the !'ouble;
28. Hopes for cooperation in all areas of joint interest which fall within the
Community s sphere of activities and urges that, once official relations
have been established, a comprehensive list should be drawn up of possible
areas of cooperation and specific problems, such as the financing of
East-West commercial transactions, and mutual information on the potential
for and limits of economic cooperation thereb-y extended;
29. Stresses above all the Community s great interest in improvements in
envi ronmental protection measures in the Soviet Union, since it is
affected by many instances of environmental pollution, regards closer
cooperation in the field of advanced environmental protection technology
as essential and calls on the Soviet Union, on the basis of the eJ(isting
Conventi on on long-range transboundary ai r polluti on (ECE Geneva) and the
Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna) to step up its
cooperation with the Community and its Member States on environmentaL
issues, for example in maintaining the ecological balance in the Baltic;
30. vJelcomes the Soviet Union s readi ness, after the nuclear accident in
Chernobyl, to increase the exchange of information and cooperation in the
peacefu l use of atomi c energy  recogni zes in the IAEA Convention on rapi d
information and assistance in the case of nuclear accidents initial
examples of specific cooperation which must sti II be considerably expanded;
31. Recogni zes the enormous potential for the Community and its Member States
on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other to cooperate in research
and welcomes the cooperation initiated in the development of a nuclear
fusion reactor for electricity generation (ITER) under the auspices of the
IAEA as an important step forward;
In the field of security:
32. Points out that, since 1973, the Community and European Political
Cooperation have contributed to the CSCE process and recalls its explicit
support for that process;
33. Considers negotiations on more far-reaching confidence-bui lding and
security-promoting measures in Europe to be just as urgent and important
as negotiations between the USA and the USSR on the reduction of strategic
nuclear weapons systems and expects the European countries to be more
heavi ly involved therein;
34. Welcomes the INF Agreement signed on 6D,ecember 1987 by the USA and the
USSR as the first commitment to achieve th~ abolition, with on-the-spot
verification, of an entire class of weapons which were principally
designed for use on European territory;
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Europe, in particular,
an agreement on short-range nuclear weapons, combined with the
abolition of the imbalance in conventional weapons and the achievement
of a balance at the lowest possible level of armament,
- a ban on and the destruction of chemical and biological weapons;
36. Regards the offer made by the Political Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Pact in May 1987 on the mutual clarification and adaptation of the
military doctrines of the two alliances as encouraging and believes that
its seriousness should be tested by a corresponding Western proposal;
37. Calls on the Community and its Member State.s within the Western .all iance
not to reject outright or react defensively to the many security and
di sarmament policy options put forward by the Soviet leadership but to
test the seriousness of their intentions by presenting practical counter
proposals;
III. As regards cooperation on international issues and with the Third World
38. Is pleased to note that the Soviet Union has finally begun to withdraw its
intervention troops from Afghanistan in accordance with the timetable
agreed under the Geneva Accord of Apri l 1988; 
39. Welcomes the clearly increased interest of the Soviet Uni.on in taking part
in multi lateral cooperation to solve world trade problems, in supporting
an active role for the United Nations, in making a contribution to the
campaign against hunger and underdevelopment in the world and in
cooperating with the West in the settlement of regional conflicts, such as
the .war between Iran and Iraq and in southern Africa;
40. Welcomes the wi II ingness of the Soviet Union, which has hith~rto provided
hardly any aid, to cooperate in drafting guidelines for making avai lable
for development projects in the Third World the resources released as a
result of disarmament, recalls its positive opinions on a policy of that
nature and calls on the Member States and on European Political
Cooperation to give simi lar support; is aware, however, that fewer weapons
may mean just as much devastation and more money does not automatically
mean improved development potential;
41. Stresses the great importance it attaches to the development of normal
relations as equal partners between the European Community and the Soviet
Uni.on;
42. Takes the view that the basic conditions for the establishment of
diplomati c relations between the Soviet Union and the' Community exi st;
43. Assumes that the Soviet Union now unconditionally recognizes the reality
of the Community, and that this includes the application of Community law
to Berlin (West);
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European Political Cooperation (EPC) to establish as part of their foreign
policy a regular and \4ide-ranging political dialogue with the Soviet Union
on the development of relations and maintaining peace in Europe;
considers it appropriate for this dialogue to be held within the same
framework as contacts with other important thi rd countries and groups of
states and ca lls on the Sovi et Uni on to take up the di a logue at a hi gh
pol itical level;
45. Confi rms its resolution of January 1987 to the effect that, once official
re lations are established between the Communi ty and the Sovi et Union, it
will establish independent relations with the Supreme Soviet and takes the
invitation issued to its President to pay a visit to the Supreme Soviet as
a sign that the latter, too, is interested in such relations;
46. Welcomes the Soviet Union s willingness to hold a detaiLed exchange of
views with the European Parliament on humanitarian and other issues, in
particular in connection with and in preparation for discussion of human
rights issues at the CSCE Conference, and ca lLs on it sBureau to make
arrangements for such a dialogue once official relations have been
established with the Supreme Soviet;
47. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the
Counei l" the Forei gn Mi ni sters of the Member States meet i ng in European
Pol itical Cooperation and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the
Sovi et Uni on.
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The rapporteur undertook a fact-finding mission in Moscow from 3 to
13 fv1ay 1988. Whi le there, he met the following for political talks:
State and Party;
M. Gorbachev * General Secretary of the CPSU (Communist Party
of the Soviet Union)
A. Dobrynin* Member of the Politburo of the CPSU
Head of the International Department of the
Central Committee of the CPSU
L. Tolkunov Chai rman of the Union Soviet
W. Sag ladi n* Deputy Head of the International Department of
the Central Committee of the CPSU
S. Achromeyevtc Marshal of the Soviet Union, Head of the
Genera l Staff of theSovi et Armed Forces
I. Ivanov Deputy thai rman of the State Committee for
International Economic Relations in the
Presidium of the Counci l of Ministers
A. Kova lev* Fi rstDeputy Foreign Minister
Y. Busyken Special Ambassador in the Se.cretariat of the
Foreign Minister, responsible for negotiations
on the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the European Communi ty and the USSR
G. Petrov Deputy Head of the Section for Trade and
Economic Relations with the developed
capital i st countries
S. Zotov Deputy Head of the CSCE Section in the Foreign
Ministry
W. Sajkin* Chai rman of the Executive Committee of the
Moscow Sovi et
J. SHin Deputy Ghai rman of the Soviet Commi ttee for
European Security and Cooperation
Political and scientific institutes
Institute for the Economy of the Social ist liorld'System at the USSR Academy 01
Sciences: Professor O. F. Bogomolov, Director; Professor W. J. Dashichev.
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at the USSR Academy of Sciences: Professor I. E. Guriev, Deputy Director;
Professor W. Lashi chev; Professor V. Pankov; Dr V. Zuev;Dr W. Baranovski;
Institute for State and Law at the USSR Academy of Sciences:
Professor V. S. Vereshchetin, Deputy .Director; Dr A. Larin;
Professor Kartashkin; Dr I. Krylova; Professor Lukashuk; .Dr I. Baturin;
Europa Institute at the USSR Academy of Sciences: Professor V. N. Shenayev,
Deputy Director; Dr A. V. Tsimailo.
Other eminent figures
Metropol itan Fi laret*, Metropolitan of Kiev, Member of the Holy Synod of the
Russian Orthodox Church; E. Grigoriyev, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Pravda; V.
Korotish, Editor-in-Chief of the weekly magazine . Organyuk' ; L. Timofyev,
Editor of the dissident periodical ' Referendum
also: Mayer-Landruth, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany,
representing the Counci l Presidency.
------------------
* Talks held in the company of the leader of the German Social Democratic
Party (SPD), Hans-Joachim Vogel.
------------------
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This is the first report drawn up by the European Parliament on relations
between the Community and the Soviet Union - more than 30 years after the
establishment of the European Community and almost 10 years after the first
direct elections to the European Parliament. It marks the end of a
paradoxi cal situation where the world power on the European continent and the
world' s major trading power officially ignored each other and yet had to take
account of each other in their daily lives; thus it was that Soviet Communist
territorial aspirations in Europe boosted the unification of t1estern Europe
over many y.ears, ~Ihi le the success of the Community demonstrated the fallacy
of the Soviet doctrine that competitive anarchy between national economies in
the advanced stage of capitalism would lead to their mutual destruction.
Simply because of its political and military power.. the Soviet Union
influences and defi nes re lations between the states throughout Europe. The
Communi ty.. as ' the basi s for a broader and deeper communi ty among peoples long
divided by bloody conflicts ' (Preamble to the ECSC Treaty) has as its task to
lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe
(Preamble to the EEC Treaty) and 'together make their .own contribution to the
preservation of international peace and security' (Preamble to the SEA).  The
policy of the Soviet Union and the events in that country were always
important for the Community.. its Member States and its citi zens. Events in
Western Europe, domestic and foreign policy developments  in  the Member States
and the process of integration in the Community were always of special
importance to the leadership and the citi zens of the Soviet Union.
The USSR is", in part, a European power. Its enormous si ze does not prevent
internal events.. such as the nuclear catastrophe at chernobyl in Apri l 1986
from di rectly affecti ng the Communi ty. The effects of modern technology have
made the world seem smaLLer. The Soviet Union has become a neighbour of the
Community, even though there is no common frontier between them.
The USSR is part of European history. It made a decisive contribution to the
destruction of fascism in Europe in the Second World War, which the Nazi
regime  in  Germany had forced on its European neighbours to the east and to the
west, fighting alongside the Allies and making an enormous sa.crifice in terms
of human life and property. It emerged as one of the four vi ctorious powers
whi ch, under the four-power agreement of 3 September 1971, has di rect rights
and obligations in Berlin, including West Berlin, p.art of the territory of the
Communi ty.
The USSR is one of the centres of an ideology which is part of the political
and cul tura l hi story of Europe but whi ch was freely rej ected by the nations of
Western Europe and North America. Its power politics" which are the practical
expression of that ideology, contributed substantially  ta  the division of
Europe. They are regarded by the broad majority in the nations of the
Community as a threat and grounds for adopting a defensive attitude.
The USSR is the leading power in the Warsaw pact in which it continues to
treat its allies according to the principle it n~i'd down of ' limited
sovereignty , whereby the limits of sovereignty are not determined freely but
are imposed by the Soviet Union.
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United States of America, and, as such, it is not only an adversary but also a
partner of the USA in the concept of mutual deterrence from any violent
attempt to change their spheres of power and influence by the use of military
might. The succe.ss or failure of efforts to achieve disarmament and detente
and in the campaign against hunger and under-development in the world depend
on its attitude. The USSR is a European superpower with influence and
security interests on the European continent which exist independently of its
social system. The peaceful, well-ordered co-existence of European nations,
in which the problems of modern industrial societies are mastered, is only
possible and permanent by working with the Soviet Union, and not against it.
Seen against this background, it is not the mutual recognition, the
establishment of diplomatic relations and the reorganization of cooperation
which is remarkable but the fact that there was none of this in the past. The
formalization" expansion and extension of cooperation between the Community
and the USSR wi II in fact only bring about a situation which, in the interests
of both parties, ought to have been achieved a long time ago.
Ini t i a lty, the Soviet Union tota llyrej ected the idea of European
integration. On ideological and political grounds, it was, for a long time,
not prepared to recognize the Community as a political reality. It rejected
it as a ' temporary phenomenon ' and claimed it was simply an 'economic appendix
to American imperialism Subsequently, it tried to ignore the existence of
the Community, opposed its participation, for example, in speci~list
conferences and in specialized agencies of the UN and hampered its
particip~tion in multi lateral treaty negotiations. In the mid-1970s, by means
of negotiations between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and
the Community on the establishment of official relations between both
organi zations, it tried to recogni ze the Community only on conditions which
wou ld not rea lly have r.espected the economi c and lega l rea 1 i ty of the
C ommun i ty but unde rm i ne it.
Where opportunities of improving relations arose, they were repeatedly
hampered and destroyed by continuing violations of human and civi l rights in
the Soviet Union and by its policy in Central and Eastern Europe and in the
Third World" in particular the military invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968
and of Afghanistan in 1979. In so doing, the Soviet Union clearly breached
the international obligations it had accepted when it signed the UN Charter
and the CSCE Final Act, to which the Community is committed.
For a long time, the Community, too, was not prepared to seek and develop
normal relations with the Soviet Union. That resulted largely from the
gradual process of its own internal integration and the development of its
foreign relations. Originally, the Community possessed neither powers and
responsibi l ities nor the necessary instruments for the basi s of any foreign
policy activity, i. e. for security policy. However, it i's security policy in
Europe which was and remains the major, dominant issue in relations with the
Soviet Union.
Previous relations between the Community and the Soviet Union offer a diffuse
outL inewithout contours or overall design. " A nt'Jrnber of contacts, on a
bilateral basis and, above all, in multilateral fora, have developed and, over
the years, has grown considerably stronger in an unplanned fashion. But they
remained hampered by reservations and uncertainties and were not harnessed
into an overall political framework. The security policy prospects were left
blank, as was the normality of diplomatic recognition.
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contacts. In that process, the Soviet Union accepted the Community as an
international partner for the first timeD However, even there, the dispute
with the USA, not with the European countries, held centre stage for the
Soviet Union.
Bi lateral trade is more important to the Soviet Union than to the Community.
Although in 1988 it accounted for only 6. 6% of total foreign trade for the
Community, in the Soviet Union, where it counts for almost 20%, it is of
considerable si ze. In the past, the Soviet Union had a trade surplus with the
Community almost every year.
However, trade relations are not based on any formal agreement. Unlike the
other European COMECON countries, the Soviet Union has not yet concluded even
sectoral agreements with the Community. Furthermore, since 1984, trade has
declined. That is the result of deteriorating terms of trade for the Soviet
Union and of its increasing indebtedness. The constraints of COCOM also
hamper many business relationships, in particular uncertainty as to how it
wi II be applied.
Since 1979, multi lateral cooperation has resulted in the Soviet Union and the
Community nonetheless becoming negotiating and treaty partners in 24
agreements or conventions. This development did not arise from the political
concept of cooperation but from the increasing powers and responsibi lities
attributed to the Community in the fields of trade, economi c law, raw
materials agreements and food aid, as welL as fisheries, environmental
protection, nuclear research and safety. Unti l 1985, cooperation in a
multilateral framework was still affected by the reservation regularly
eKpressed by the Soviet Union that such cooperation in no way altered its
negative attitude to the Community.
The signing of the Joint Declaration on the establishment of official
relations between the EECand COMECON on 24 June 1988, ~Jhich Parliament
endorsed unopposed, opens the way for the establishment of bi lateral official
relations between the Community and the individual member states of COMECON
without further delay. Th.e Soviet Union has begun corresponding
negotiations. Diplomatic relations may well be established before the end of
this year.
II. NEW ELEMENTS FOR THE NORMALIZATION AND EXTENSION OF RELATIONS
The Soviet Union and the Community are demonstrating a new interest in the
normal i zat i on of re lati ons. The prerequi sites for the success of these
efforts, with the objective of at least partially improved cooperation, have
improved enormously: the international framework conditions, within which both
parties are acting, have changed, the Community s capacity to act in foreign
and security policy bas been extended and its political clout increased, the
new thinking ' in the USSR, leading to the policy of Perestroika, has opened
up points of contact for better mutual understanding.
Changes in the international framework conditions
, ..
The new interdependencies
Technological developments have led to a situation where the use of modern
weapons would damage the stronger just as much as the weaker party. A nuclear
war in Europe would lead to the destruction of European civi l i zation as a
~JhoLe .
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continent, where in the Community alone there are 121 and in the USSR 50
. nuclear reactors as well as an unknown number of highly endangered and,
therefore, highly dangerous technical plants and chemical substances, the
effects of the powers of destruction of the mi l itary would be uncontrollable
and, therefore, unlimited. No country and no alli.ance in Eur'ope can let loose
its mi l itary might without causing the destruction of its own country~ That
makes the limitation and reduction of the destructive potential stored in
Europe the central task of security pol icy. It also changes its substance:
in the nuclear age, especially in the narrow European theatre, ideological
differences .ay no longer define foreign and security policy actions. That
does not remove the contradi ction between social systems but relegates it to a
lower level and forces East and West to find other means of dispute and new
forms' of cooperation. Security in Europe can no longer be achieved by each
party going up against each other but only by working with each other. Either
security is indivisible, or there is not security.
In its deci sions on the p'ol iti cal aspects of a European security strategy(1),
Parliament expressed its conviction that European security policy must be
based simultaneously on a policy of defence and detente. It supported
controlled and balanced disarmament with a view to achieving a defensive
strength no greater than that requi red to act as a deterrent and the
development of broader and deeper cooperation in the fields of economics,
science and technology, environmental culture, in order to create a network of
mutual dependencies which supports security through the interdependence of
mutual interests and which makes it reliable. The Single European Act
conferred On the Community a series of powers and responsibi l ities for the
impLementation of such a policy. It thereby became a valid and obligatory
partner of the Soviet Union.
The decline in the significance of the East - West conflict
The confLict which has characterized East - West relations for more than 40
years is losing its significance as new problems common to both sides emerge
whi ch the Sovi et Uni on and the Communi ty can no more avoi d than the other
deveLoped industrialized nations. The interdependence of the nations of the
worLd.!' and in particular of Europe, is growing to the extent that the enormous
innovati.ons in research and technology are confronting societies in East and
West, North and South with simi lar opportunities and simi lar dangers.
They change the economic and social structures on both sides of the dividing
line, and the opportunities and dangers are often situated inseparably next to
each other. Modern means of communication, the use of nuclear energy, genetic
engineering, further developments in medicine, new materials and the
deve lopment of new chemi ca l compounds resu l t in changes in work and li fe forms
as well as environmental destruction and manipulation. They affect human
beings irrespective of national boundaries and differing social systems and
therefore, can only be mastered jointLy.
faced by these challenges, East and West must work togetner. This has nothing
to do wi th a policy of convergence and harmoni zation of systems. That is
neither intended nor necessarily connected with it. Cooperation in the light
of increasing interdependence may leave ideol?gical contradictions just as
untouched and open as cooperation to secure peace 'most do. Cooperation to
solve certain problems faced equally by both sides is not only necessary but
also feasible. The powers and responsibi l ities attributed to the Community
must lead it to seek new ways to achieve cooperation with the Soviet Union
and, for its part, make the Community into a partner which the Soviet Union
can no longer ignore.
(1) Resolution of 14 October 1987, OJ No. C 305, 16. 11. 1987, p. 81
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The economic and political reforms drawn up and introduced since Mr Gorbachev
took over as General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985 do not justify the
normalization of relations but they do improve the basic conditions. The
Soviet Union is going through a period of change which, on its own assessment,
is to be revolutionary. That creates new opportunities but also new
uncertainties. Cooperation between the Community and the USSR must take
account of both aspects.
Acknowledgement of realities
The intention of the Soviet leadership to face up to real ides in its Ol-Jn
country and in the world, to reassess them and to base its political activity
on those realities leads to a situation where... in some important issues, the
Community may reach agreement with the Soviet Union in its assessment thereat.
Today, the Soviet Union assumes that security in Europe is 'indivisible ' and
can only be achieved and maintained 'jointly For the first time, it
therefore recognizes the security interests of the West as legitimate and sees
them as indivisibly linked with its own interests in survival. Not only does
this fact differentiate Gorbachev s policy from Khruschev s ' policy of
peaceful co-existence ... it also diverges from the twin-pronged detente policy
of Brezhnev ~hich, in some fields, vias prepared to accepteconom-ic and
political cooperation but... at the same time... disregarded Western European
security interests in a provocative manner by working on the principle that
the Soviet Union s security increased to the extent that Western Europe
security decreased. And, finally, it even departs from the previous
ideological foundation of Soviet security policy according to which capitalist
countries are only capable of remaining peaceful for short periods, but not as
a general rule, whi le socialist states by defin'ition cannot pose security
problems for other countries.
Today, the Soviet Union is becoming aware of its inevitable involvement in
international economic events. This has been the reality for a long time now,
even if the USSR does not participate in important international fora such as
GATT, IMF, the International Texti le Agreement or attend world economic
summits. Since 1984,. because of the fall in O"j l prices and the devaluatior! of
the dollar... the terms of trade have been deteriorating steadily for the Soviet
economy. Consequently, the USSR wants to overcome its largely self-imposed
isolation and attract capital and know-how into the country through
international cooperation. This is not another case of trying to make up the
enormous leeway vi s-A-vi~ the West in severa l areas of the economy, technology
and consumer foods. What it involved is not letting the leeway become any
greater and protecting the Soviet Union from a severe economic crisi~ which,
in its own words, would reduce it ' to the status of a developing country
The weaknesses and mistakes of the past are increasingly damaging the image of
the Soviet Union as a model and pacemaker for economic progress in the
count ri es of the Th i rd World. The overa II accs lerat i on in the USSR, whi ch was
partially very successful in recent decades,. has completely lost its impetus.
In the last fe"J year's, the Soviet Union has be.en unable to increase its
political influence in Southern Africa, in Central America, on its Asiatic
flanks or in the Gu l f.
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but above all, its mi l itary invasion of Afghanistan, have now proved to have
been serious mistakes in every respect. Apart from mi l itary aid to a few key
countries, its practical aid to underdeveloped nations remained marginal and
brought no political advantage. The Third World only expect economic aid and
techni cal progress from the capitalist countries or frOIR the People s Republic
of China. Politically and ideologically, it goes its own way. The Soviet
Union has isolated itself increasingly from world developments not only in
economic terms but also in political and ideological terms. Its influence has
continued to wane, and its role as a world power is increasingly based solely
on its military potential.
The reformers in the USSR are among the sharpest critics of the mistakes and
inadequacies of the Soviet system. The new leadership has not hesitated on
numerous occasions to spell out the problems which need to be solved:
The Sovi et economy is stagnat i ng. for 15 years now, growth rates have been
nominally decreasing. In the 11th five-Year Plan (1980-1985), virtually
zero growth was recorded. In an address to the Central Committee of the
CPSU in February 1988, Mr Gorbachev said that, if in the calculation of
national income, certain distoring factors such as revenue from crude oi 
exports on the basis of increasing prices on the world market and revenue
from alcohol sales on the Soviet market were ignored, Soviet national
income had registered no increase in real terms over four Five-Year Plans.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, it had actually decreased. When the
pol icy of Perestroi ka was introduced, the Soviet Union was faced by a
serious economic crisis characterized by inadequate supplies of consumer
goods, outmoded equipment, ossified organi zational and leadership
structures and the irresponsible waste of resources.
The supply of goods to the population, even to satisfy basic material
needs, is inadequate, and the quality of everyday goods very poor. 
1985" according to a Soviet assessment, it only corresponded to 29% of
international requirements~
Soviet undertakings engage in economic activity on an extensive basis.
That leads to wasteful exploitation of the country s natural resources.
addition" they work on the assumption of an ' inexhaustible ' reservoir of
labour. However... in view of demographi c developments, that is no longer
avai lable.
The means of production and infrastructures are outmoded. For example, in
the central sector of the foodstuffs industry, a large number of
undertakings date from before the Revolution. For many decades, investment
was channelled into expensive and frequently uneconomical new enterprises
instead of into the modernization of existing undertakings. As a general
rule... only 2 - 3% of old machinery is renewed... although Soviet experts
reckon that a renewal rate of 6% is required. Losses 'in economic values
caused by inadequate infrastructures such as transport and storage are
officially calculated at up to 30%.
Worker discipline and social morale have fallen, and the vicious circle of
inadequacies is closed by 'laziness,  oss;fie~management structures and
bureaucracy ' (Gorbachev).
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- from communications technology to services - it has no dynamic economic
branch which might serve as the motor for a development impetus. Although its
mil itary high technology is among the best in the world, it cannot act as a
motor for the economy because the military sphere is strictly isolated from
the rest of the economy.
Perestroi ka - restructuri ng of the economy and soci ety
The new Party programme of 1 March 1986 adopted at the 27th Congress of the
CPSU - the first Congress under Per.estroika - highlights the speeding up of
socio-economic development as the major theme. An increase in the standard of
living and quality of life is one of its basic objectives. Perestroika is
opposed to strengthen the effi ciency of the Soviet economi c system and
modernize it. It has four major basic principles:
1. Changeover from an economy di rected by a central administration to a
large ly autonomous economy
According to the decisions taken at the Central Committee plenary session of
June 1987, what is basically invoLved is the following:
The powers and responsibi l ities of GospLan, the State Planning Committee,
which previously administered some 24 million articles, will be reduced to the
establishment of macroeconomic framework conditions, and production planning
wi II be transferred to individual undertakings. This should lead to the
economy being less subject to bureaucratic interference. In addition,
wholesale trade will be freed from a central allocation of the means of
production and the banking system restructured in an attempt at
decentralization and division of activities.
In future, individual undertakings wi II playa central role. The law on state
undertakings and associations, whi ch entered into force on 1 January 1988,
defines the new key concepts of economic policy: the merit principle,
individual initiative and individual responsibi lity. That includes financial
autonomy for undertakings. They wi II have to keep a profit and loss account
relating to the undertaking, take thei r own decisions on wage increases and
investment and, the reverse of the coin, run the risk of having to clos.e if
they are unprofi table. Undertaki ngs are no longer to produce ' products
allocated from a central bureaucracy but ' goods ' which have to sellon a
market. The efficiency of undertakings is also to be strnegthened by the
introduction of aspects of an internal democratization. The staff will have
the right to elect their own directors and foremen. This new constitution for
undertakings is regarded as the driving force behind Perestroika.
The pricing system wi II be reformed at all levels with the objective of
eliminating state subsidies and endeavouring to achieve market balance by the
skimming-off of surplus purchasing power. Simi lar attempts at reform in other
Eastern European countries demonstrate that this is the politically most
dangerous restructuri ng proj ect under Perestroi ka. It requi res immedi ate
material sacl'ifices from the population, although the promised improvements in
the overall economic situation can only be a~hieved in the long term.
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the explosiveness of the necessary price reform: in the Soviet Union,
foodstuffs are generally sold at a price equivalent to half the production cost. For example, a Soviet housewife pays about two roubels for one kilo of
meat for which the State has paid three roubels in subsidies. Subsidies for
mi lk, meat and bread alone amount to 90 bi II ion dollars per year. That is
almost one fifth of total State expenditure. Prices for fuel are 33% Lower
than the world market price and for other raw materials 67% lower. One tonne
of coal costs 18 roubels, but it is sold to domestic consumers for 12 roubels
and to agricultural holdings for 9 roubels. This has Led to a reckless waste
of raw materials which can only be halved by a more realistic relationship
between price and production costs and by an extensive aboLition of State
subsidies.
Increasing the efficiency of economic production and social performance
wi th the ai d of economi c and techni Ca l progress
So that it does not lag even further behind the development of Western
economies, the USSR is attempting to participate in the enormous innovatory
leaps in modern micro-electronics. The accumulated need of the Soviet Union
in all at'eas is great. Not only has the USSR lost the race with the West, it
is falling further and further behind the emergent countries in East Asia.
One indi cator. is the progress of mechani zation. For example, in the
foodstuffs industry, of a total of 4 million employees, 1.5 mi II ion are still
employed on purely manual work. Manual labour in the industry is to be
drastically reduced by the year 2000. The capacity of the Soviet telephone
network corresponds to the USA' s network in 1930: the ratio between American
and Soviet urban calls is 25 to 1, for intercontinental calls 150 to 1.
According to Western estimates, there are" at present, in the USSR about
50 000 personal computers, .compared with about 30 mi II ion in the USA.
Reform of forei gn trade structures
The reform of foreign trade is, probably, one of the most revolutionary
elements of Perestroi ka. The structures of the foreign trade organi zation set
up in 1918 survived to 1986 almost unchanged. From that date, for the first
time in the history of the Soviet Union, foreign trade is to become a part of
the independent activities of undertakings. This wi II also have di rect
impli cations for the development of economi c and trade relations between the
Commun"ity and the Soviet Union.
The reforms introduced largely surpass earlier efforts made under Khrushchev
and Brezhnev. They provide not only for a new order at the top of the
organization but also for the Soviet domestic market, for a decentralization
of foreign trade operations in selected economic areas, in line with th.e new
law on undertakings. Every undertaking is to be given the right to establish
direct foreign trade relations. By the end of 1987, 26 specialist Ministries
and 75 major undertakings and producer associations and scientific and
technical complexes have been given the right to engage in foreign trade.
They account for more than 20% of the Soviet Union s import and export
operations.
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operations. A foreign currency credit market has been developing since the
beginning of 1988 on which undertakings which have a foreign currency account
may loan foreign currency to other undertakings at a profit. In May 1988, the
law on cooperatives was passed which enables the approximately 14 000 market
and profit oriented private cooperatives, with some 150 000 employees, to have
access to foreign trade in full competition with State undertakings. Finally,
since January 1987, the law on joint undertakings permitted the creation of
joint ventures with Western or even COMECON undertakings. This will make it
easier for Soviet undertakings to use the urgently requi red Western capital
and know-how. According to official figures, by the end of 1987 there were 20
joint ventures with Western firms and another 200 were being discussed. One
year after this new form of economic cooperation was permitted, this is .
sma II number, a lthough agreements between underta ki ngs of very vari 
importance in economic and technological terms are included in that figure.
Unl i ke earlier attempts at reform, the.se new departures are not primari 
concerned wi th new target figures but wi th new mechani sms for the economy.
Above all, the ' human factor ' is ascribed a more important role i.e. the
economi c entity working on its own responsibi l ity and at its own risk.
Glasnost - the new transparency in political and economic processes
Attempts had peen made at economi c reforms in the past. The reform known as
Perestroika differs from all earlier ones in so far as it regards the
political opening up of the system internally as an imperative precondition
for su.ccess. Khruschev tried to impose reforms from above, Gorbachev is
trying to base them on cooperation.
Glasnost is a scinti llating concept. It describes both steps towards
democratic participation in the nomination of party officials and managers of
undertakings as well as, and above all, more freedom of speech and thought,
opportunities for criticism and counter criticism, in the press and academic
circles, in art and entertainment. Glasnost is designed to make Perestroika
attractive. Its job is to motivate and provide an impetus for Soviet society
and release its creative forces. According to Gorbachev it is an effective
form of controlling the activities of all and indeed without exception all
government bodies: it is a mighty lever with which mistakes can be corrected.
In assessing Glasnost, two errors must be avoided: an overstatement of what
is intended and an underassessment of what may well be released. It is said
that Glasnost contradicts Marxist-Leninist theory less than did its Stalinist
practice over more than sixty years. Glasnost leads to a destalinization of
thought - wi th a II the imponderables whi ch are connected wi th a freei ng of the
spirit. The call to everybody to add their contribution to the same total of
ideas will necessari ly unmask the stereotypes and cyphers whi ch have been in
power for generations and call into question the claims and the acceptance of
the' CPSU as the infal\ible judge of all matters concerning political and
social life.
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As Gorbachev himself said to the Central Committee of the
the reform process wi II be contradi ctory, compl i cat~d and
lead to success or to fai lure. In order to estimate what
ave to come to terms wi th in establ ishing and developing
important that the fundamental social conditions in which
is being carried out are clearly recogni zed.
CPSU in June 1987,
difficult. It may
the Community wi 
relations, it is
the reform process
Perestroika means restructuring to strengthen the system. It is not designed
to tone down Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union but to strengthen it.
Gorbachev and others have repeatedly emphasised that Perestroi ka is designed
to strengthen social ism, to overcome everything standing in the path of its
development and hampering its progress, open up its gigantic potential in the
interests of the people, bring the enormous advantages of (the Soviet Russian)
social system into play and give it the most modern forms. The Soviet
leadershi p wi II therefore not overstep the bounds lai d down by
rtjarxism-leninism. Ownership of the means of production will remain in
principle in the hands of the State. There is no intention of encouraging the
development of a pluralistic democracy as the West knows it. Internal
di sputes in the CPSU are probabl t more concerned with the sea le .and speed of
reforms rather than the substance and di rection of the Soviet social system.
Perestroika i,s a cumbersome process which is progressing .more slowly than the
reformers would wish. But, compared with the stagnation in Soviet society
over recent decades, the speed is breathtaking. It is slow if it is measured
against the needs and intentions of the reformers. Not until the thirteenth
Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) wi II aU undertakings be working in accordance with
the new economic principles. Until then, there will be a difficult
transitional period when numerous aspects of the old system will still be in
force.. side by side with slowly expanding aspects of the new system. For
example", elections to factory management wi II be introduced gradually. The
principle of economic accounting, i.e. financial aut"nomy and covering costs
in accord~mce with the new law on State undertakings, will be applied to 60%
of undertakings in certain sectors such as the engineering industry from 1
January 1988. It is to apply to the entire Soviet Union one year later.
Perestroi ka aims at a controlled restructuring in the Soviet Union. Success
depends, therefore, on the party organi zation at aU levels and local and
regional administrations being won over to support the reform. The civi l
service in the Soviet Union is enormous: according to Gorbachev s own
figures" it involves 18 mi II ion people: 2.5 mi II ion in the organi zation of
various administrations and 15. 5 million as administrative staff in
undertakings and associations. That means that there is one civil servant for
every 6 or 7 Soviet workers. Some of them - and not only them - are taking
delaying action. New ideas... which require a different way of thinking, are
therefore only slow ly bei ng trans lated into practi ce. It is ca lcu lated that
the abolition of central planning will result in 8 million civil servants
losing their jobs over the next few years. That strengthens resistence, which
is based partly on a personally motivated fear of losing power and privileges
and partly on ideologically motivated anxiety at the destruction of the entire
rul ing system.
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some success. It influenced certain staff policy decisions in the last few
months, found expression in the election of delegates to the 19th Union
Conference of theCPSU and emerged partially through disputes in the Soviet
press. The party conference, convened for 28 June 1988 and which is to be
devoted largely to issues of further democratization in the party and society,
may well give us a better idea of how bro.adly based the support for the reform
movement in the party and State organi zations really is.
Resist.ance against the implementation of reform comes not only from the party
organi zation and the State administration, the majority of the population,
too, seems to be taking a ' wait and see ' attitude. Above all, as Gorbachev
sai d, Perest roi ka requi res a restructuri ng in the mi nd, pract ice in dea ling
with the opportunities and risks of acting on one s own responsibility. In a
society such as that in the Soviet Union, that requires a lengthy learning
process. The practi ce employed by factory managers for decades of aski ng the
State for money instead of earning money wi II not change overnight. There
are, as yet, no signs of a dramatic increase in productivity. The soundness
of the new economic course has not been proved by any data. Some sectors have
improved, but, in 1987, the targets were not reached: in the engineering
industry the achievement rate was only 82%, in the chemical engineering and
timber industries only 74%. Economic growth in the first nine months of 1987
amounted to 3. 6% although, in the same period in 1986... it had amounted to
2%. GospLan... the State Planning Committee, seems to be interfering more
rather than less. A time wi II collie It/hen the Soviet people wi II judge
Perestroika on tangible economic improvements as well.
Not all aspects of Perestroi ka can be acceler.ated in such a balanced and
simul taneous manner that contradi ctions and fri ction are avoided. In autumn
1987, strike action was taken in various factories because the State quality
control findings had resulted in wage cuts. This new measure, introduced as a
discipl inary measure, led to understandable annoyance among the workers
because the poor qua l i ty recorded was caused not by thei r poor wor 
performance but by the delays in supplies of materials, for which the State
was responsible. Wage cuts based on poor quality work only make sense if the
factories themselves are also responsible for suppl iesof materials.
A further problem is demonstrated by the hesitant taking up of the new
opportunities for private economic activity. Since May 1987, ' individual
labour , i.e. the establishment of individual undertakings or private
cooperatives, has been permitted in certain service sectors. The issuing of
tradi ng licences began more s lowly than anti ci pated, a l though, when seen
against the background of a period of several decades when personal initiative
was frowned upon... the initial figures do not look so bad: six months after
the law entered into force, there were forty private restaurants in Moscow
and, in the entire USSR, around 8000 private cooperatives with .80 000
employees. The early difficulties arose partly from the fact that the
requi rements imposed were too severe, and loca l authori ti es responded
inflexibly or even negatively. The high rate of taxation on private income
earned in cooperatives also plays a role. A survey also disclosed the
ambivalent attitude of the people to the new opportunities. 76% of those
questioned thought that it was a good ideab_ut only one-tenth of them .said
that they were ready to take the ri sk themselvei;'
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not make any breakthrough. This will probably be dramatically demonstrated in
two years when the Soviet economy, which wi II have been completely transformed
by Perestroi ka, needs a large number of the new kind of managers who are
capable of taking entrepreneurial decisions. The Soviet leadership is sti 
hesitating to follow the Chinese example of sending young executives to train
in the West.
According to Ni kolai Ryzhkov, the Chai rman of the Soviet Counci l of Ministers,
13% of all Soviet undertakings operated at a loss in 1986. In 1987, the first
bankruptcy in the history of the Soviet Union was recorded. If the principle
of economic viability is applied in full, more bankruptcies will follow - with
all the commitment social problems so well known in the West.
Such may be anticipated principally as the consequence of the forced
technological revolution. According to the activ~ty report of the UN
International Labour Organi zation (ILO) of September 1987, in the next few
years, 13 to 19 million people in the Soviet Union will have to give up their
current manual jobs. To that figure must be added the prospective 8 mi llion
civi l servants, the figure quoted by offi cial sources, for whome new jobs wi II
have to be found. Those are enormous figures, particularly for the USSR which
prides itself on the guarantee of full employment as one of its achievements.
The principle of payment by results and, to some extent, free prices will lead
to uncertainties; the employees ' basis of existence will become dependent on
the economic success of their undertakings and will simultaneously leave them
open to the danger of an increase in the cost of living. Undoubtedly, that
will give rise to social conflicts. The question to be answered is then
whether the Perestroi ka pol icy can withstand such stress.
To date, the most successful part of Perestroi ka is that known as Glasnost.
The actual change is not covered by the currently remarkable freedom of
information and opinion in the dai ly and weekly press. Even the toleration of
publications by dissident organizations, however important this may be, does
not show the ex tent and depth of the changes that have occur red. Much more
durable wi II probably be the effects of progressive TV youth programmes such
as ' Twelfth Floor , which has 100 million viewers according to official
sources, of films such as ' Risk' on the development of nuclear weapons and
mass destruction, of publications such as ' The children of Arbat' by
Anatoly Rebachov or ' Life and faith' by Vassil Grossman concerning war and
terror under Stalin.
Glasnost has set in motion a cultural mass movement in which political clubs
and spontaneous groups with social, ethnic or cultural interests are sprouting
like mushrooms: within one year, some 1200 in Moscow, some 400 in Leningrad
and others over the whole country. Many of them have already united to form
federations.
The offer of more freedom and candour is being made to a society which is much
more receptive to it than was the case when Khruschev made his attempts at
reform. This may result in Glasnost extending further than its originators
had thought and would like. Soviet society is in the process of becoming
pol iti cal' Therein lies the explosive power which Glasnost represents, not
only for current Soviet policy but for the future of the Soviet social order
as a whole.
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Economic and social reform is intended to strengthen the Soviet Union
economic performance, thus underpinning its position as a world power and
giving fresh appeal to Marxist-Leninism. Of course, it is by no means clear
yet whether Perestroika will be successful in the Soviet Union, and if so, to
what extent - and what will be the practical consequences, not all of them
intended, for the future position of the Soviet Union in a European .and world
context. Community policy here should be guided by the recognizable
implications of the present phase of Soviet reforms in the fields of security
in Europe and hum.an rights in the Soviet Union, and should be directed by the
Community s economic and political interests.
Soviet security and alliance policy
Soviet security policy has not only developed in a new direction with regard
to Soviet wi llingness to conclude the INF Treaty, thus putting into reverse
plans to rearm with nuclear medium-range missi les targeted on vJestern Europe.
The Soviet leadership is in fact in the process of reviewing three fundamental
positions which have in the past stood in the way of agreements and stable
relations:
1 . There is a new wi II i ngness to permi t on-the--spot inspect ions duri 
disarmament and arms reduction. As recently as January 1984 the then Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko rejected verification at the beginning of the CSCE in
Stockholm as ' spying on the Soviet Union The Soviet attitude changed when
he was dismissed, in the summer of 1985, five months after Gorbachev assumed
office The conclusion of the CSCE in September 1986 led to the first
agreements on si gni fi cant confi dence-bui ldi ng measures between East and West,
including the possibility of carrying out verifications on the spot. To this
extent the CSCE was a step in the direction of the INF agreement. In May 1987
the Warsaw Pact confi rmed the important princi ple of reci proca l controls.
This shows that the Soviet Union has drawn the practical conclusions from its
statement that security is 'indivisible ' and can only be attained through
cooperation; it recognizes that the ' capitalistB countries also have
justifiable security interests.
2. There is a lso a new readi ness to recogni ze that there are cases of
asymmetry ' in the field of conventional arms in Europe in favour of the
Soviet Union. Whi le the USSR admits to superiority in the number of tanks and
in artillery, it complains of western superiority in the field of attack
bombers and helicopters. A balanced process of disarmament to remove such
asymmet ri es wi II requi re long and di ffi cu l t negoti at ions. Sovi et readi ness to
negotiate does of course open up the possibi l ity of negotiating the r.emoval of
such asymmetries and finding a way out of the impasse which has dogged MBFR
negotiations since 1973.
3. There is also a new readiness to review with NATO the' military doctrines
of the respective alliances and to reformulate defence strategies. The key
concept here is B a reasonable sufficiency of each side s potential' This
does not only imply a willingness to limit arms to the dimensions required
just for defence, but also a preparedness to
, '
regroup Soviet armed forces
(Marshal Achromeyev) in Europe, possibly deprivlhg' them of an invasion
capability.
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controlled disarmament in the new positions taken by Soviet security policy.
This derives not only from the new definition of 'joint' se~urity and
sufficiency of defence forces, but also from the need to reduce the enormous
cost to the Soviet economy of its permanently advanced nuclear and
conventiona l arms readi ness at the expense ofPerestroi ka.
Whatever motive may prevai l, the Community must ensure, withi EPC, that the
Western Alliance takes these new aspects of Soviet security policy seriously
and tests thei r viabi l ity for balanced arms reductions and confidence-bui lding
cooperation by making proposals of its own.
The Community is not the Soviet Union s negotiating partner for th.e mi l itary
dimension of security policy. But it does have, through the Single European
Act, a duty and an opportunity to contribute to a poli cy of disarmament and
confidence-bui lding in Europe, supporting and extending that policy through
econollIic cooperation.
The declared intention of the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce
thei r strategi c nuclear arms by 50% should also be welcomed from the European
point of view. At the same time, the European Parliament' s repeated demands
for further disarmament measures with regard to the nuclear, chemical and
conventional weapons in Europe should also be borne in mind. In this regard
the Vienna MBFR negotiation$, the CSCE follow-up conference in Vienna and the
cSCE special conferences remain important fora. 
The Community and European Political Cooperation (EPC) have participated in
the CSC process from the outset. They have always regarded its various
baskets ' as a single entity, and have treated their special contribution to
the fields within their responsibi lity as also constituting a contribution to
securi ty issues. Par l i ament has always emphati cally supported the CSCE
process and the Community s role in it, creating through its initiatives on
the issues of disarmament and confidence-building in Europe the conditions for
the Community s security policy dimension.
Peace in Europe is founded on the premise that all nations, even with
differing social systems of their own devising" must be permitted to live in
security. That security is founded not only on a balance of military forces
between countries and alliances, but also on the stability of social relations
within such countries. If the balance is constantly readjusted and internal
freedom is suppressed there can be no stabi l i ty or securi ty.
While the new aspects of Soviet security policy have already become apparent
in connection with Perestroika in the field of disarmament and arms control,
they are sti II largely unclear in Soviet pol icy towards the Eastern European
countries. Soviet policy is creating the opportunities for local-based
reforms in these countries, though such opportunities may as yet be unclear,
and they too wi II be in the Soviet Union s interest, in v';ew of those
countries ' current economic and military burdens and their intention to open
up external economic relations, even if they do not slavish imitate the
Perestroika model. The Yugoslav-Soviet declaration of March 1988, pointing to
the Communi st Party s right ' to choose the; r own way to soci a l; sm
independently ' could actually be a first sign tn-at the Brezhnev doctrine of
the ' l i mi ted sovereignty ' (as defi ned by the USSR) of the Warsaw Pact member
states has been superseded. However, at the same time the Soviet leadersh; p
is endeavouring not just to maintain cohesion with the Warsaw Pact and the
CMEA" but to strengthen it. In any case, neither the Belgrade Declaration nor
the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan should be seen as a clear departure
from the Brezhnev doctrine.
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further twenty years on Soviet terms, and from pressure for greater
involvement of the Eastern Europeans in the distribution of the Alliance
burden, the basic structure of Soviet policy on .Eastern Europe is intended to
remain intact. There is no contradiction in the fact that the intensification
of Warsaw Pact summits could lead not only to greater Soviet influence but
also, conversely, to greater participation by the Alliance partners in the
decision-making process. The CMEA programme for scientific and technical
progress of December 1985 and the recently launched internal CMEA joint
ventures reflect persistent endeavours for stronger integration of the Eastern
European economies with the Soviet Union. These efforts seek to control and
confine the external policy and security policy consequences in Eastern Europe
of Soviet reform and to secure Sovi et predomi nance in the long term at a lower
pol it i cat andeconomi c cost.
The new leadership s policy on Eastern Europe the-refore seems to be aiming to
stabil i ze the Sovi et sphere of influence by reducing the Eastern European
countries ' susceptibility to crisis, through a limited equation of interests
and the concession of greater internal room for manoeuvre. The Community has
no need to impede the Soviet leadership in this policy. It is entitled to
assume that the scheme is unl i kely to succeed.
The respect of human rights in the Soviet Union
In numerous resolutions and its annual reports on human rights in the world,
Parliament has repeatedly criticized the violation of basic human and civil
rights and pressed for compliance with the Helsinki CSCE Final Act. In the
CSCE process the Community has always emphasi zed the great importance it
attaches to progress on human rights issues and it has underlined the
connect i on it sees between progress in the fi e ld of human contacts and
cooperation, Basket Three of the CSCE Final Act, and the other baskets on
security and economic relations.
The reforms in the Soviet Union have so far left unchanged the distinction
between individual civi l rights and collective social rights whose enforcement
is adduced to justify restricting the rights of the individual. It is
nevertheless possible to detect a change in attitudes to human rights issues.
Such a change can be detected not only in the treatment of a few leading
Soviet dissidents, for the benefit of Western public opinion, such as Andrei
Sakharov, who was allowed to return to Moscow from exi le in November 1986, or
Ida Nudel, the 'mother of the refuseni ks ' and Anatol Sharansky, who were
permitted to emigrate to Israel after years of waiting. Many of the large
number of less well-known imprisoned or exiled opposition figures have also
been released, over 6000 of them in the first ten months of 1987 alone.
The current number of ' political prisoners ' cannot be precisely ascertained,
since it depends in part on how ' political prisoner ' is defined. The Soviet
authorities admit to 17 persons detained under Article 70 of the Soviet Penal
Code (for ' anti-Soviet propaganda ) as being ' political prisoners The
Russian Orthodox Church quotes between 200 and 300 whi le dissident groups
refer to 400 ' political prisoners It is possible that there is also a
(fairly small) number of opposition figures who are being detained in
psychiatric institutions although their state 6f' health in no way warrants
thei r detent i on. It wi II remai n the duty of the Communi ty to use all its
political influence and institutional position to press at every opportunity
for the release of political prisoners in the Soviet Union.
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often estimated at about 400 000, with the figure for the refuseni ks, whose
applications have already been turned down, put at about 12000. The
conditions for emigration are to be relaxed fallowing legal reform in the
Soviet Union, which has already begun, but they wi II n.ot be discarded
completely.
Relations between the State and the Russian Orth.odox Church are also more
relaxed. During preparations for celebrating the millennium .of Christianity
in Russia in June 1988 some of the mista.kes made in the past in relation to
the Church and its fo llowers were admi tted and there were i ndi cat ions of a new
appr.oach to relations between Church and State. The Communist Party hlils
announced a bi II .on freed.om .of conscience to replace the 1929 law on the
Church. However, the Russian Orthodox Church seems rather unlikely t.o be or
become a pi llar of the democratic political oppositi.on. Its relationship with
other denominatians and rel igians in the Soviet Unian remains tense.
The democratic political opposition, which is organized in a number of groups
of varying sizes and to varying degrees of flexibility, has more room for
manoeuvre today than it did before 1985. The number of its supporters and
thei r influence on publi c opinion in Soviet saciety is a matter of
conjecture. Although meetings, and the publication and distribution .of
periodi cats, are monitared, they are also talerated - provided that they do
not turn against the principles of ' socialism, Leninism and Gorbachev ' (ta
quate Lev Timofyev, publisher of the dissident magazine 'Referendum '). The
farmation .of an oppasition party, which was attempted in early May 1988 and
prevented by the authorities, is also a controversial matter amang the
dissidents themselves. Some cansider it to be caunter-productive in the
present climate - partly because a common pal iti cal denominatar for the
opposition groups does not exist.
Although the minor freedoms for political opposition groups are by no means
estlilbl i shed, but .only conceded and can be wi thdrawn at any time, they are a
reality at present. However, graups which attempt to call for ethnic freedom
and autanomy in the Soviet Union are continuing to be administratively
suppressed. Their demands cancern not only the development of political and
social order in the Soviet Union but also the unity and continuance of the
multinational State itself.
The Savi et Unian has recent ly shown a much greater readi ness to li sten to
Western compLaints .of violatians of human and civi lrights and to investigate
them, as was nated, for instance, by the delegation fram the Political Affairs
Committee during its visit to the CScE follow-up conference in Vienna in
1987(1). There are hopes that the Sovist Unian will no longer automatically
regard and reject representations on human rights as interference in its
internal affairs. Some aspects are taday openly discussed, such as
conditions in psychiatric cLinics.
The refarm of the legal system raises the prospect of . or has already led ta,
changes which are intended to bring Soviet law ' into line with the Soviet
Union s international obligations ' (meaning mainly the cSCE Final Act and the
UN Charter). Gorbachev has lately been ta~king of creating iii 'socialist
legal State It remains ta be seen how far tfte" new Laws and legal
(1) Memarandum an the fact-finding mission to the CSCE follow-up Conference in
Vienna (21-23 October 1987) for the Political Affairs Committee,
PE 118.099 of 30 October 1987
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it an offence to commit healthy persons to psychiatri c institutions, the law
of November 1987 on the right to appeal against administrative decisions or
the revision of Articles 70 .and 190 of th.e Penal Code (on ' anti-Soviet
propaganda ) wi II actually improve respect for human rights in the Soviet
Union.
The extent of respect for human and civi l rights is assessed variously by
different opposition spokesmen. Some consider that it is still 'just talk'
while others confirm that substantial, if ~till insufficient, changes have
actually taken place. But they appear to agree that the current relaxations
and freedoms have only been ' conceded' by the authorities and can he reversed
at any time. The path of reform taken by General Secretary Gorbachev is
critici zed as too hesitant, inconsistent and inadequate, but sti II as giving
cause for hope and it is therefore supported.
For the Community, respect for human and civi l rign~s, and particularly the
observance of the CSCE Final Act, must remain a major criterion for the shape
of its relationship with the Soviet Union. Parliament must continue to press
through the appropriate channels for the release of political prisoners, for
freedom of opinion and religion, greater flexibility on emigration and the
extension of democratic rights.
IV. THE SHAPE OF FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE SOVIET UNION
Real ity and prospects for trade and economi c r.elations
The expansion of trade and economic relations should obviously stand at the
centre of plans for the future relationship between the Community and the
Soviet Union. Here the Community has a responsibility to play its part.
The condi tions for a sound partnership, dovetai ling the strengths and
weaknesses of each side, are favourable. The Community, with its
hi ghly-developed technologi cat and economi c know-how, need= the Sovi et Union
as a market for its products, as a supplier of raw materials and energy and as
a partner for the development of environmental protection and scientific
cooperation. The Soviet Union, with a barely-developed market of 283 mi llion
peop le, possesses enormous supp lies of energy, resources and rawmateri a ls;
as it emerges into a modern cOnsumer and industrial society it is dependent
upon cooperation with the Western world.
There is of course a wide gap between the prospects for economic relations and
their reality. In the past three years the decline in the dollar exchange
rate and low wor ld market pri ces for oi l and gas have drastica lly worsened the
terms of East-West trade. In the first six months of 1987 such trade fell to
6% of total world trade, its lowest level since 1970 (4.5%). Trade between
the EC and the USSR has also declined since 1984: between 1985 and 1987
imports into the EC from the USSR fe II by 38% in va lue terms, while exports to
the USSR fell by 27%. At the same time the Soviet Union s indebtedness rose
by 19% in a ~ingle year, totalling approximately US $38 billion at the end of
1987, according to Western estimates (1985 = US$ 13 bn approx.
). 
This rise
in indebtedness derives largely from a recalculation of non-dollar debts in
dollar terms, but applies to almost 50% of~ll Soviet external debts.
However, the USSR has always served its debts punctually in the past and
continues to be reckoned as a country with an average credit risk, on a par
with, say, South Korea or Saudi Arabia.
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went into deficit for the first time. The Soviet Union alone faced a deficit
of US $4 bn. The fact that these figures in the main reflect changes not in
the terms of trade but in economic relations as a result of the substantial
fall in value of the dollar, shows how strongly dependent the Soviet economy
has become on international economic events. Thus its profits from oil
exports diminished by 32% in 1986 and again by 22% in 1987. Over the last
few years the Sovi~t Union has on its own admission lost foreign currency
worth about 6 bn roubles as a result of monetary fluctuations.
The Soviet Union itself is responsible for this development. Its ~xports,
80% of which consist of oil and gas, are unbalanced. Soviet politicians
themselves complain that the Soviet Union has become dependent on Western
industrial i zed countries as a supplier of raw materials because its processed
goods are not sufficiently competitive on We.stern markets. Soviet imports
are restricted by the lack of foreign currency and the growing debt problem.
Western trade partners face substantial difficulties from the bureaucratic and
inflexible organization of Soviet foreign trade, which has remained virtually
unchanged since lenin s time, particularly because of the monopoly on foreign
trade and forei gn currency i n the hands of central government and party
bodi es. The present round of reforms ai med at decent ra li zi ng busi nesses and
increasing their flexibility have not yet taken effect. Again, with the new
organi zational structures, the move towards greater openness to the outside
world and alignment with the requiements of international trade will only
succeed if the internal economic reforms are successfuL as well. This is
particularly true of the radical reconstruction of business organization and
of pri ce reforms. The convertibi l ity of the rouble as a cornerstone of open
trade with the West implies that Soviet goods will also become ' convertible
which means that they wi II have to withstand competition with Western goods.
Soviet reformers do not consider this feasible before 1995.
The range of legal and practical instruments for setting up joint ventures -
the most difficult and yet most promising form of international cooperation -
is sti II inadequate, partly because industrial patents are insufficiently
protected. The reform of Sovi et patent law has not yet been comp leted. 
May 1988 there were only 14 joint ventures with companies from the Community,
despite great efforts on both sides.
However, there is also a reluctance to step up East-West trade on the Western side. The export restrictions on products with advanced technologies, as a
result of the COCOM lists, are a case in point. Parliament has always
acknowledged the need for controls on the transfer of technology in the case
of goods with a security risk. Nor is this contested by Soviet
pol iticians. But it has always argued that the limits must be tightly drawn
and qui ckly adapted to account for the di ssemination and general accessibi l ity
of scientific and technological knowledge.
The COCOM decisions of January 1988 are a step in the right direction.
The Commi ssion must do its utmost to ensure that the lists are further reduced
and published, and that the control procedures are simpl ifi ed, so that
uncertainty and unnecessary bureaucracy do ~ot further reduce the permitted scope of cooperation. 
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ever, trade in advanced technology must have pride of place. Many
highly-developed products require a technologically developed market. It is
inconceivable, for instance, to export modern Western teLevisions to the
Soviet Union with its antiquated television network. The expansion of trade
and technological progress ~re mutually dependent. In its own export
interest, the Community has no use for a Soviet Union that is technologi cally
backward.
The Community has an interest not only in largely unimpeded trade to the
state-trading countries but aLso in open trade in the field of the most
advanced products and procedures. Scientific and technological advance
frequently relies today on international cooperation. Here the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe can i.n many respects rank as equal partners. The transfer
of technology through East-We.st trade need not be- a one-way street - at least
in the medium term. The trade in high-value advanced technology, for
instance in plant design, could lead to far greater economic integration than
merely trading processed goods for raw materials. Modern technologies, in
industriaL production, health care, the control of nuclear power or the
confinement of environmental hazards, are just as indispensable for the
countries of Eastern Europe as for the European Community. By contributing
to this task the Community will be assisting ~ith the protection and care of
its OWn citi~ens, as well as promoting internal stability and peace in Europe.
To develop the potential for trade between the Soviet Union and the Community
and exploit it to the full, trade relations must be placed on a reliable
contractual basis. The official Soviet reply to the Community s 1974
proposaL is still awaited. Unofficially, the Soviet Union has stated its
interest and begun setting out its ideas for discussion. The Community
should respond in a constructive way and give a clear signaL of its political
will to support cooperation.
In doing so it must bear in mind that the legal framework of a traditionaL
trade treaty with state-trading countries such as the Soviet Union ~Ji U not be
enough to stimulate an expansion of trade and economic cooperation. The
Community should respond constructively to the Soviet proposaL to lay down, in
a comprehensive cooperation agreement, the outLine conditions for broadly
based cooperation, not only in the field of industry but also in research,
technology, envi ronmenta L protect i on and other areas of mutua l interest.
Parliament would remind the Council and Commission without more ado that it
regards such an agreement with the Soviet Union as constituting a 'significant
international agreement' within the terms of the Stuttgart SoLemn Declaration
(see Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure), in the preparation of which
Part iament wishes to be involved to a greater degree than in the past, as
accepted by the Governments of the Member States.
It is not the purpose of thi s report to go into detai lon' the content and
scope of such an agreement. Nor is the time yet ripe for such detai l to be defined. For the moment there needs to be a comprehensive review of the
opportunities created by cooperation between the Soviet Union and the
Community. In this the Community should p~ovide active assistance, as it has
begun to do, for instance, with success in thecbiitext of relations with the
PeopLe s Republic of China.
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cooperation going beyond the traditional spheres, and have also done so on
behal f of the CMEA. For example, they are proposing cooperation in the fight
against modern illnesses such as canc~r and AIDS or in the prognosis and
assessment of modern research and advanced technologies. The special value
of such cooperation lies in the fact that only very considerable scientific
and financial effort is likely to produce results in these areas and that such
cooperation is evidently in the service of mankind. An awareness of the
common element binding .Eastern and Western Europe would undoubtedly be more
rapidly and lastingly strengthened from the results obtained jointly from such
an endeavour than from many other enterpri ses.
By way of indication, four areas may be mentioned in which practical
cooperation between the Community and the Soviet Union has already begun ina
multilateral context.
Cooperation on environm~ntal protection
This is not the place to dwell on the mistakes and shortcomings of the
Community and its Member States as regards environmental protection. It is
enough to call them to mind. But the Community countries are also affected
by the gi ganti c sca le of ex ploi tati 011 of the natura l envi ronment i n th~Sovi et
Union and other CMEA countries. The catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear
power station, is a particularly spectacular example of this, but not the only one. The forced pace of industrialization on the basis of high energy
consumption wi thout proper envi ronrnenta l protection is tantamount to legalize
destruction of the environment. The long-term climatic changes brought about
by changing the course of major Russian rivers must be taken no less
seriously, as must the additional air and water pollution which is already
di scernible today, such as the pollution of a major European waterway, the
Baltic.
One of the most promising devel.)pments of the ' new thinking ' policy is the
fact that public awareness of environmental problems in the Soviet Union has
increased and the determination to solve them has become apparent, not only in
the general public but also at government and party level. Since January
1988 the Soviet Union also has an environmental committee. Its first task is
to draw up a comprehensive envi ronmental legislative programme. The Soviet
Union s European neighbours should expect this to promote international
cooperation on envi ronmental protection.
The Community and the Soviet Union are already involved in two specific
agreements on envi ronmental protection, the convention on combating long-range
ai r pollution (1979 and 1984) and the convention on protection of the ozone
layer (1985). They are also co-signatories of five multi lateral agreements
on fisheries and the protection of species in various oceans. There is a need
to bui ld on the experi ence of these fi rst ventur.es in future and to tackle
other joint operations. The Baltic Conference in Helsinki in February 1988
led to a first declaration on limiting discharges of harmful substances into
the Baltic, measures to prevent oi l pollution and the protection of Baltic seals. This must be consolidated and translated into binding commitments, as
the sudden proliferation of algae in the Nor~h Sea and the Baltic has shown.
The Community must be prepared to contribute its' Veading position in advanced
environmental protection technology to cooperation in the general interest.
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thi s area, another market for Community envi ronmenta l technology has been
created. Its extent is estimated at DM 165 bi II ion just for measures to
combat air pollution.
Cooperation on reactor safety
In most cases the 50 nuclear reactors in the Soviet Union do not conform to
the safety requi rements imposed on Western reactors. After the catastrophe
of Chernobyl there has been increasing readiness in the Soviet Union to treat
nuclear power with greater Care. It is now more prepared for international
cooperation than before chernobyl. The conclusion in 1988 of two conventions
under the auspi ces of the IAEA on early noti fication and assistance in the
event of nuclear accidents or radiological emergency, to which the Community
has already acceded or is about to accede are important steps forward. The
Commission, whi ch has  yet  fully to exerci se its r.esponsibil ity as the EURATOM
authority, has a duty to encourage cooperation with the Soviet Union with the
aim of increasing the safety of Soviet reactors in the interest of Community
citizens and of taking faster and more efficient safety measures in the event
of a disaster than happened w ith Chernobyl.
Cooperation on research
As regards r~search a start has already been made on cooperation over nuclear
fusion for energy production, in which the Community and the Soviet Union lead
the field. Following the agreement in late 1987 between the EC, the Soviet
Union, the United States and Japan, in May 1988 ten scientists in each country
began to produce a design for a thermonuclear test reactor (ITER). It is
intended to show that fusion energy is really suited to the task of solving
energy supply problems in ~n economical and environmentally safe manner.
Nuclear fusion is obviously only one example of possible cooperation in
research. The ' complex programme for scientific and technical progress in
the CMEA countries to the year 2000' , adopted in December 1985, lists a number
of other fields in which East and West could cooperate more closely. The
Community should examine the outline proposal put forward by the Soviet Union
and its allies very carefully.
Cooperation in international policy, particularly in the Third ~orld
In talks with Prime Minister Craxi, Secretary General Gorbachev stressed that
the Soviet Union also wanted to ' seek a common voice on specific international
issues The main obstacle to such a ' common voice ' has been the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and its occupation of that country in
succeeding years. The Geneva agreement of April 1988 in which the Soviet
Union undertook to leave Afghanistan under a specific timetable before the end
of the yearp clears the way for cooperation in international policy,
particularly in the Third World.
With the end of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the Community should turn
its attention to the mani fest interests of the Soviet Union, in its policy of
new thinking , in greater participation and responsibility in international
politics, for instance in GATT, the world textile 'agreement and the Uruguay
Round, as ~Iell as in the North-South dialogue. It should draw up plans for
cooperation with the Soviet Union in a sober and unhurried spirit, but also
with determination and without delay.
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the past but also the decisions of the 27th party congress and the central
committee plenum of the CPSU in January 1987, the Soviet leadership s numerous
statements since then on the ' new thinking , including foreign pol icy, and the
initial reforms of Perestroi ka. The Soviet Union itself can have no interest
in a destabi l izing Western currency system or a collapse in the developing
countries' debts. It too is involved in the world economy de.eply enough to
sustain severe damage in such eventualities.. The fact that the Soviet
leadership is increasingly recognizing this is clear from its recent actions.
The Soviet Union is upgrading the role of the United Nations and its
commitment  to  their activities; in early 1988 it settled its UN debts and
declared its willingness, in a departure from its long-standing practice, to
give Soviet staff at the UN long-term contracts as international officials in
accordance with the UN Charter. It has also made efforts to cooperate with
the We.st in the Security Council. It is providing substantial hunger relief
for Ethiopia in the form of 250 000 tonnes of wheat, the largest ever Soviet
aid measure to the Third World and a few thousand tonnes higher than United
States commitments in thi s case. It has ratified the important fi rst account
of the Common Fund for Commodities signed in December 1987 at the 7th UNCTAO
Conference, thereby not only enabl ing the agreement to enter into force but
also committing itself to a share of nearly 6% of contributions totalling
$470 mi II ion. Finally, it has declared its intention of paying funds
released as a, result of controlled di.sarmament to an 'international solidarity
fund' for aid to the Third World, to contribute to fighting poverty, '
eco logi ca l deve lopment and greater sel f-suffi ci ency of the developi 
countries through di rect, non-repayable grants.
Compared wi th ~estern achi.vements and endeavours in the North-South conflict,
Sovi et efforts so far have been limited, but they are signifi.cant .moves when
seen against the background of the previous abstentionist policy. They
deserve to be considered seriously as a step in the direction of effective
cooperation between East and West in fighting hunger and underdevelopment in
the world. At a time when the authorities in the Soviet Union are carrying
out what they themselves term a I revolutionary ' and deliberate departure from
old dogmas and patterns of behaviour, it would be dishonest and shortsighted
for Western attitudes to be guided solely by the old judgments and
perceptions. That would deprive the Community of politi cat latitude for its
own policy of stabi l ity and cooperation in the preservation of Western
interests. The Soviet Union s ' new thinking ' also represents a challenge to
Western pol icy to think again.
CONCLUSIONS
Parl iament attaches great importance to normalizing relations between the
Soviet Union and the Community and to expanding relations based on partnership.
The normalization of relations should be completed in 1988 with the
establishment of diplomatic relations. This will of course mean that the
Soviet Union must give the Community unrestricted recognition in its full
reality, including the territorial application of the Community in West Berlin
and the participation of Berlin Members in the European Parliament.
Part lament naturally also expects that the estatrUshment of di plomati c
relations wi II put an end to the reservations which the Soviet Union has
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of the Community in international agreements" conferences and conventions,
opening the way to unrestricted and unreserved cooperation.
The Soviet Union has since 1985 shown signs of a change in the working climate
and in its practi cal contacts with the Community and its institutions.
Encounters in international fora have now largely become unpolemical and factual. In particular, the Soviet Union has shown a welcome readiness for
dialogue in response to the numerous initiatives of Members and political
groups of the European Parliament. This has helped considerably to improve
the climate. In its resolution of January 1987 Parliament expressed a wish
to take up official contacts of its own with the Supreme Soviet and to develop
a comprehensive and lasting dialogue after the establishment of official
relations between the Soviet Union and the Community. With the establishment
of the Delegation for relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
it has created the conditions for such contacts arid is now waiting for it to
begin work without delay.
The imponderables of the reform process must not .be a reason for a passive,
wait-and-see approach to the Soviet Union. The Community must not make its
pol icy dependent upon speculation on the success of the reforms. The
arguments in favour of normalizing and expanding relations lose none of their
validity as a result of the ambivalence of the reform process. The process
of openness and new thinking in the Soviet Union confi rms the strength of the
basic principles on which the Community itself is founded, even if the Soviet
leadership is attempting to put them to use for its own model of society
within the limits of the Soviet system.
In Soviet pol icy there is clearly a new interest in expanding relations with
Western Europe. The USSR is not only prepared to take the Community
seriously as an economic partner in the prospect of completion of the internal
market. It also intends to consider the Community as a political partner '
the extent that the Community acts as a political entity Today it regards
the unification of Western Europe as an ' objective process " meaning a
development in which there may be setbacks and delays, but which is basically
irreversible and cannot be impeded, let alone prevented, from outside.
Whether the Sovi et Union is banking on the independence of Western Europe wi th
the aim of undermining the unity of the West and separating the Community from
the United States, or is not pursuing such an aim, is open to question but
immaterial. The crucial issue is not what the Soviet Union intends to do but
what are the values and interests holding the Western alliance together.
Broader and closer cooperation between the Community and a Soviet Union which
is preparing to carry out the most comprehensive changes to its political and
economic principles and structures since 1917 conforms with Western values and interests. It is moreover in the interest of all European countries that the
Community and its fllember States should not exacerbate and reinforce the
division of Europe forcibly created by the Soviet Union 40 years ago, by
neglecting or even rejecting the possibi lity of new cooperation between East
and West. The new Sovi et policy represents an opportuni ty to reduce and
perhaps even overcome the division of Europe through cooperation and
confi dence-buildi ng measures. Whether this is what such a pol icy rea lly
seeks is uncertain. What is certain, how~ver, is that the Community itself
must seek such an objective, in the interest ot' freedom" security and peace in
Europe.
EN(88) 1756E - 38 - PE 119.475/fin.ANNEX I
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION tabled by Mr MATTINA pursuant to Rule 47 of the RuLes of
Procedure, on relations between the European Community and the Soviet Union (doc. 82-558/85)
The European Parliament,
~aving regard to the ideas on relat ions between the Soviet Union and
Comecon and the:European Community expounded by .the new General Secretary
of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, at his recent meeting
with the Italian Prime Mini ster , 8ettino Craxi , President-in-Office of the
Council
whereas it is necessary to sound out the new Soviet leadership
willingness to establish economic relations with the European community,
in order to put an end to the diplomatic si lence between the two halves of
Europe,
whereas the institution of formal relations between the European Community
and, Comecon is an essential precondition for consolidating Europe s role
in the preservation of world peace, as a pivot of detente between East and
west and North and South,
warmly applauding the Italian Presidency for the commitment it has shown
to enhancing the Community s image abroad at the very highest levels , by
bringing the negotiations on Spanish and Portuguese accession to a
successful conclusion and consolidating economic and political relations
with thi rd countries
Expresses keen interest in the possibility of establishing formal
relations with Comecon and the Soviet Union;
welcomes the diplomatic overtures made by the Soviet General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev, and the firm pledge by the Italian Prime Minister,
Bettino Craxi, to encourage this process of rapprochement;
Calls on the Council of Ministers and the Commission to open a regular and
fruitful dialogue with Comecon and the Soviet Union;
Instructs its President to invite, on behalf of Parliament, the General
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, to Strasbouf'
for an official visit to the European Parliament;
Inst ructs its competent commi ttee to d raw up a repo rt on the state of the
European Community s relations with Comecon and the Soviet Union;
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and
Commission of the European Communities and the Goverment of the Soviet
Uni on.
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION tabled by Mrs BOOT and others , on behal f of the Group
of the European People s party (CD Group) pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of
Procedure, on the situation of the Jews in the soviet Union (doc. B2-1041/85)
Ih~_~~rQ8~ 2Q_E2I!i2~~~!'
having regard to the steadi ly deteriorating situation of the Jews in
the Soviet Union, who are an oppressed cultural minority subject to
various displays of more or less avowed anti-semitism,
whereas only 896 Jews were allowed to emigrate in 1984, although more
than 350 000 had expressed their desire to leave the Soviet Union
without obtaining an exit permit
drawing attention to the various international conventions signed by
the Soviet Union and, in particular, the Final Act of' Helsinki,
sharing the views expressed in the report and resolution adopted in
September 1985 by the Counci l of Europe on the situation of the Jews
in the Soviet Union,
Appeals to the Soviet Government to abolish the various forms of
discrimination affecting Jews in the Soviet Union in all areas of
economic , social and cultural activity, in particular, in the exercise
of the right to learn and teach Hebrew;
Calls for the release of all Jewish prisoners of conscience;
Calls for all Jews wishing to emigrate to be allowed to do so;
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to theCounci l
the national governments and parl iaments and the government of the
Soviet Union.
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION tabled by Mr PORDEA and others pursuant to Rule 47 of the
Rules of Procedure, on Romanian territories annexed by the Soviet Union
(doc. B2-1198/85)
whereas the annexat ions of territory by the Soviet Union at the end of
the Second World War, to the detriment of the countries of ,Eastern Europe"
and in particular the annexation of, large areas ' of Romanian national" 
territory constit\,lte one of the most serious problems in Eastern Europe,
whereas Bessarabia (44 000 km , where, formerly, 86. 7% of the population
were Romanians, according to Russian statistics from the early nineteenth
century) , a province belonging to the Romanian people since it came into
being in Dacia and, since the fourteenth century, forming the eastern
part of the Romanian princ ipa t i ty of Moldavi a, was anne2ed by the Russ 
i ans
for the first time in 1812; whereas Bukovina (10 440 km , where 78% of
the population were Romanian, according to Western .estimates at the end
of the eighteenth century) , aterritory which h'ad also belonged to the
Romanian people since time immemorial , was annexed by Austria in 1775;
whereas, lastly, Hertza, to the north-east of Moldavia where in 1944
987. of the population were Romanians and which had never pr,eviously been
ceded, was annexed by the USSR in 1947 ~henthat country also reappropriEted
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina,
whereas the past colonization by Russia and Austria has altered the ethnic
pattern 0f these regions, the percentage of Romanians in the population
having fallen within a century, in favour of the Russians , Ukranians and
to a lesser extent , the Germans; whereas, nevertheless, the RofUimian
nationaL resistance movement was .able in 1918 to Liberate these provinces and
to declare their union with Romania, a status approved by treaties concluded
wi th the major powers
whereas
f rom the
Bukovina
Romanian
together
following a Soviet ultimatum and because no assistance WaS forthcoming
West, as provided for by Romania s all iances, Bessarabia and Northerh
were occupied in 1940, liber.ated in the course of the war with heavy
losses , only to be reoccupied by  the  Soviet Union and annexed,
with Hertza , in 1947
whereas, in order to destabilize it more, Bessarabia was then divided, its
central part becoming the Soviet Socialist Republic of MoLdavia, whiLst the
north and south of the province were annexed to the Ukraine along wi 
Northern Bukovina and the district of Hertza; whereas a regime of terror
was installed there and Romanians were deported to the Ukraine, Kazakhstan
Siberia and the artic region (about one million Romanians since 1945); whereas
the destruction of the national identity of the majority group, described as
Moldavian and  colonization on a large scale by Russian and Ukrainian
peopLe (over one miLliord have substantiall.y altered the ethnic structure of
these regions , which no~1 have about three million Romanians in a total.
popuLation of five mi ltion inhabitants
Notes that OG the basis of ethno-demographic criteria, by virtue of the right
to national self-determination and in view of regionaL cu~ural realities
(linguistic unity, customs, traditions and beLiefs), Bessarabia, Northern
Buknvina and !~e region of ~ertza belong to the Romanian people; notes that
the USSR has ' ,cr')(' i"-d t:jr t' terri ror ies and alJ,~,ev,:,(j them 1:, vie. Lat ion of its
int",rnat ional unde:' " ing" 0:"-  )1  fund-3:,,€ntal cllnr;;~ r~31-)to;;
(on,;emns th,:; ~oviet f;(",\Jf?rnment and ti;e ~k,,~i";.j;i ""rhoririt's for their'
pollcy intenced t:; dec;tr"y Iii!' I;(;cional identH " cd ' ;H~ Romani::.ns living
in these areas . ,"~'ch is c8!lt"iflOufil to genociue;
instructs its  yo.
:'" 
jelen, to fc-r..,ard tlii s resolut lon to the Counei t, and the
Commission of nit. EI;rnpeiJli ComriL,nitiE5 and the Foreign r'1illisters meeting
in political con0er~Lion
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8. Political relations between the EC and the Soviet Union
Doc. A2-155/88
RESOLUTION
on political relations .between the European Community and the Soviet Union
The Ewopean Parliament,
having regard to the following motions for resolutions:
motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Mattina on relations between the European
Community and the Soviet Union (Doc. B2-558/85),
motion fora resolution tabled by Mrs Boot and others on behalf of the EPP Group, on
the situation ofthe Jews in the Soviet Union (Doc. B2--1O41/8-5),
motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Pordea and others on Romanian territories
annexed by the Soviet Union (Doc. B2-1198/85),
having regard to its resolution of 24 October 1985 on relations between the European
Community and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (I),
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having regard  to  its resolution of 22 January 1987 on relations between the European
Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Eastern
European member states of the CMEA (I),
having regard to its resolutions on human and civil rights violations in the Soviet Union
and, in particular to  its resolution of 12 March 1987 on human rights in the world in
1985/86 and on Community human rights policy(l),
having regard to its resolution of 17 June 1987 on the consequences for the European
Community of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Conference
on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (3),
having regard  to  its resolution of 17 June 1987 on the implementation of the Helsinki
Agreement and the role of the European Parliament in the CSCE process (4
having regard to the report of its Political Affairs Committee (Doc. A2-155/88);
A. aware of the major importance of the Soviet Union in the shaping of the future of Europe,
because:
as a European power (in part), events within that country may, despite its enormous
size, also affect the Community directly, as the nuclear accident that occurred at
Chernobyl in April 1986 demonstrated, since the effects of modern technology have
made the world seem smaller
as a protagonist in European history, it made a decisive contribution to the destruction
of national socialism and fascism in Europe in the Second World War, which the Nazi
regime in Germany had forced on its European neighbours to the east and west, after the
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union had ended the cooperation carried on under the
Molotov-Tibbentrop Pact, fighting alongside the Allies and making an enormous sacrif-
ice in terms of human life and property, and as one ofthe four signatory states to the
four-power agreement of 3 September 1971, it has rights and responsibilities in respect
of Berlin and consequently also within the area in which the Community treaties apply,
in West Berlin
as one of the centres of an ideology which is part of the political and cultural history of
Europe, but which degenerated during the Stalin era into a regime of despotism and
terror and is rejected in a free vote by an overwhelming majority of the nations of
Europe and North America, it has contributed in its power politics to the diversion of
Europe and is seen by the nations of the Community as a threat and a reason for
adopting a defensive attitude,
as the leading power in the Warsaw pact, it denies its allies freedom and self-determi-
nation and continues  to  treat them according to the principle it laid down of 'limited
sovereignty , whereby the limits of sovereignty are not determined freely but imposed
by the Soviet Union
as the ideological and military rival of Western Europe s ally, the United States of
America, it is not only an adversary but also a negotiating partner and contracting party
with the USA in the concept of global mutual rtuclear deterrence,  so  that the success or
failure of efforts to achieve disarmament and detente and to combat hunger and
promote development in the world depends on its attitude,
as a power which continues to refuse to comply with the conditions laid down in the
1975 Helsinki agreement, particularly as regards respect for human rights, an agreement
which it has nonetheless formally signed
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as a power which had no scruples in claiming to incorporate formerly independent
states, it continues to occupy Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
as a European superpower, it has influence and security interests on the European
continent which exist independently of the social systeIn in the Soviet Union and which
must be taken into consideration
B. having regard to the Preambles of the original treaties and of the Single European Act,
according to which the Communities were created as 'the basis for a broader and deeper
community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts' (ECSC Treaty), to 'lay the
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' (EEC Treaty) and
together make their own contribution to the preservation of international peace and
security' (SEA), 
C. convinced that the Community therefore has a duty to activate, extend and consolidate
relations with the Soviet Union in all sectors,
D. regretting that, more than 30 years after the founding of the Community, there are still no
official relations between the Community and the Soviet Union because, for a long period
on ideological and political grounds, the Soviet Union was not prepared to recognize the
Community either as an economic or as a political reality,
E. whereas initial attempts to improve relations between the Community and the Soviet Union
were hampered by violations of human and civil rights in the Soviet Union and by its
military intervention in Central and Eastern Europe and the Third World, as evidenced
most recently in 1968 in Czechoslovakia and in 1979 in Afghanistan
F. hoping that the Soviet Union will give effect to General Secretary Gorbachev s intimation to
the thenPresident-in-Office of the Council, Mr Craxi, that the Soviet Union is ready to seek
a dialogue with the Community on practical international issues;
G. resolved to establish normal relations with the Soviet Union through its own constructive
policy and to use every opportunity for cooperation to further mutual interests, promote
self-determination for the peoples of Europe, establish human rights and thereby secure
peace in Europe
I. As regards the political background to the normalization of relations
1. Notes that the basis for the normalization of relations between the Community and the
Soviet Union has improved:
(a) firstly, because of changes in the international climate, especially as a result of:
the fact that, in view of the development of armaments in the nuclear age, war in Europe
would mean the end of European civilization as we know it
the increasing clout of regional powers and new groupings of states and the inherent
likelihood of regional conflicts, which are reducing,the sigr-jficanc.e of the polarization
in East-West relations of recent decades
the innovation brought about by modern technologies which rapidly change economic
and social structures in the industrialized nations, have positive and negative implica-
tions and increase the int~Jdependence of nations and of Europe in particular
(b) secondly, because of incipient economic and political reforms in the Soviet Union, thus
enabling the Soviet Union to attempt to match the economic performance of the Western
nations, which aim:No C 262/136 Official Journal of the European Communities 10. 10. 88
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internally:
to create the conditions reqJlired for greater efficiency and competitivity in the Soviet
economy and to overcome stagnation in the economy and society by neW management
methods, including market-oriented features and the stepping up of scientific and
technological progress, and
at the same time, to overcome the ossification of the system by opening up society,
promoting private initiatives and individual responsibility, greater democratic partici-
pation in the appointment ofleadersin the party and the production process and greater
transparency and openness in public life and greater scope for freedom of opinion
externally:
to adapt Soviet policy to new realities (Gorbachev) and to regard security in Europe as
common and indivisible, in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the 27th Soviet
Community Party Congress;
2. Pays tribute to the efforts of the Soviet leadership to implement its programme of economic
and political reform but will not base its policy on any naive belief that rapid and fundamental
changes will take place;
3. Is aware, in particular, that the Soviet leadership does not intend to diverge from or dilute
Marxist-Leninist ideology, whose objectives and principles are to remain valid, and wishes to
retain the leading role of the Communist Party in public life;
4. Is aware also of the internal problems encountered in the implementation of the reform
programmes, especially the cumbersome nature of the Soviet political system, the stiff resistance
in the Soviet Communist Party based on fear that the system will collapse and personal
advantages be jeopardized, and the lack of practice of most Soviet citizens in dealing with the
risks and opportunities of freedom;
5. Notes that a number of improvements have been made in the field of human and civil
rights but nevertheless takes the view that the Soviet Government in no way fully respects these
rights;
6. Calls on the Soviet Union to adopt the legislation required by its. constitution to guarantee
the human rights specified in the CSCE Final Act as well as the human rights listed in the United
Nations Convention;
7. Calls on the Soviet Union, in the CSCE process and elsewhere to improve the facilities
available for human contact among European peoples by easing the bureaucratic barriers to
tourism and private travel into and out of the Soviet Union;
8. Appeals to the Soviet authorities to release all political prisoners and to allow those citizens
who have expressed such a wish to leave the country;
9. While welcoming the recent release of several hundred political prisoners in the Soviet
Union, regrets the fact that some of these unj\!lstly convicted prisoners of conscience are still
subject to administrative sanctions, for instance in- emPW,YJnent and in restrictions on where
they may live;
10. Asks the Soviet government to repeal those laws which inhibit religious practice and
education;
11. Believes that there is a need in the context of the CSCE process to set up a mechanism for
considering and resolving specific cases of human rights and calls on the Soviet Union to make a
constructive contribution towards putting this proposal into practice; 10. 10. Official Journal of the European Communities No C 262/137
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12. Notes that thorqughgoing legal reforms are being prepared in the Soviet Union as part of
perestroika, the declared aim of which is to bring Soviet legislation into line with anq up to the
standard of international law, in particular .to provide stronger guarantees of Soviet citizens
rights under the law, to facilitate entering and leaving the country considerably and to restrict
the imposition of the death penalty;
13. Will assess further developments in the Soviet Union on the basis of the concrete progress
made to secure peace for all the nations in Europe, irrespective of their social system, of respect
for basic human and civil rights, as enshrined in the CSCE Final Act and of the increase in
freedom for the Central and Eastern European allies of the Soviet Union which actually results
from the Soviet reform policy;
14. Considers that the presence of the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia is the result of the
military intervention in August 1968 against the movement of reforms going in the same
direction as the present reform of Gorbachev in the USSR today and therefore asks the USSR to
reassess its 1968 position and to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia;
15. Recognizes from certain features of the reform, covered by the terms ' Glasnost' and
Perestroika , that dynamic forces have been set in motion which allow long suppressed and
taboo issues to be addressed and also increase freedom of action for non-governmental groups
and individuals, which makes it difficult to assess the progress .and extent of the process of
change in the Soviet Union;
16. Recognizes the growing importance of the demands within the Soviet Union for a
reorganization and extension of the rights of nationalities and ethnic minorities there and calls
on the Soviet leadership to resolve this problem having regard to the legitimate interests of all concerned; 
17. Realizes that the process of reform in the Soviet Union has only just begun and that it will
not be possible to make a definitive political assessment of it for some time to come; recognizes
therein, nevertheless, a number of positive elements in the willingness to improve relations with
the Community on a broad basis, to overcome the self-imposed isolation of the Soviet Union
from the world economy and make it less unattractive as a trading partner and to cooperate with
the Community and the countries of the Western Alliance in tackling security and humanitarian
issues;
18. Is convinced therefore that the gradual changes set in train by the Soviet leadership may
also be in the interests of the Community and its Member States if they actually result in an
opening up of the Soviet system internally and externally;
19. Calls on the Community and its Member States to take every opportunity resulting from
the Soviet reform policy to secure peace and improve relations with a view to achieving closer
cooperation and greater mutual confidence;
20. Is convinced that, in the nuclear age, East and West bear joint responsibility for prevent-
ing the outbreak of war and that, in the long term, peace in Europe is based on the premise that
all nations may exercise their right to self-determination and thus, albeit with different social
systems, live in security;
21. Emphasizes, in this connection, that security is not merely based on a military balance
between states and alliances but also on the stability of social relationships within those states
and that there can be no stability where freedom is oppressed internally and the balance between
nations constantly procured afresh with another round in the arms race;
22. Recalls, in this context, the undertakings entered into both by the Soviet Union and the
Community and its Member States in the CSCE Final Act;No C 262/138 Official Journal of the European Communities 10. 10. 88
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23. Recalls its decision on the achievement of Political Union and on the political dimensions
of a European security strategy, whereby European security policy must be based simultaneously
on defence and detente, Le.
on the one hand, on further controlled and balanced disarmament\ including asymmetric
reduction of conventional forces, the elimination of chemical weapons and the balanced
reduction of nuclear arsenals, whereby the objective is for each side to maintain a defensive
strength no greater than that required to act as a deterrent,
and, on the other hand, on the development of broadly-based cooperation in the fields of
economics, science and technology, environmental protection and culture in order to create
a network of mutual dependencies which support security through the interdependence of
mutual interests and makes it reliable;
24. Takes as an encouraging sign of readiness to reach agreement on the central issue of
co-existence of the nations of Europe the statements made at the 27th Soviet Community Party
Congress that, in view of modern technology, European security is ' indivisible
25. Considers that, to this end, use should be made of both bilateral cooperation between the
Soviet Union and the Community and its Member States and cooperation under multilateral
agreements and conventions and all other fora in which both sides participate;
II. As regards the improvement of relations in the field of trade, technology and environmental
protection:
26. Advocates the conclusion of a comprehensive cooperation and trade agreement between
the Community and the Soviet Union and points out that it would regard such an agreement as a
significant international agreement within the meaning of Rule 34 ofthe Rules of Procedure and
hence wish to participate in the negotiations on its conclusion;
27. Stresses that the Community should also conclude comprehensive trade and cooperation
agreements with the other European states apart from the Soviet Union belonging to the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA);
28. Is aware that the export of certain goods from the Community is subject to restrictions
endorses as wide as possible a trade in the field of advanced technology and supports export
restrictions only on goods of real strategic importance;
29. Welcomes the decisions taken in Paris in January 1988 to cut the COCOM list and calls
on the Commission and the governments of the Member States to use their influence to ensure
that COCOM lists are further shortened and, in conjunction with this, that there is greater
transparency for companies and more effective verification of compliance with the restric- tions; 
30. Points out that, to date, trade with the Soviet Union has also been hampered by that
country s poor range of competitive manufactured goods and by certain foreign trade structures
which originate in the Soviet economic and social system;
31. Recognizes, in the economic reforms introduced ~~,far, sigI!s of greater flexibility, decen-
tralized decision-making and technological innovations1)'iit considers that more far-reaching
measures are necessary to facilitate international trade, e.g. the convertibility ofthe rouble and
fiscal policies favouring direct investment by Community firms;
32. Hopes for cooperation in all areas of joint interest which fall within the Community
sphere of activities and urges that, once official relations have been established, a comprehensive
list should be drawn up of possible areas of cooperation and specific problems, such as the
financing of East-West commercial transactions, and mutual information on the potential for
and limits of economic, scientific and technological cooperation thereby extended;IU. 1S8 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 262/139
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33. Stresses above all the Community s great interest in improvements in environmental
protection measures in the Soviet Union, since it is affected by many instances ofenvironmental
pollution, regards closer cooperation in the field of advanced environmental protection techno-
logy as essential and calls on the Soviet Union, on the basis of the existing Convention on
long-range transboundary air pollution (ECE Geneva) and the Convention on the Protection of
the Ozone Layer (Vienna) to step up its cooperation with the Community and its Member States
on environmental issues, for example in maintaining the ecological balance in the Baltic;
34. Welcomes the Soviet Union s readiness, after the nuclear accident in Chernobyl, to
increase the exchange of information and cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy,
recognizes in the IAEA Convention on rapid information and assistance in the event of nuclear
accidents initial examples of specific cooperation which must still be considerably expanded;
35. Recognizes the enormOUS potential for the Community and its Member States on the one
hand and the Soviet Union on the other to cooperate in research and welcomes the cooperation
initiated in the development of a nuclear fusion reactor for electricity generation (ITER) under
the auspices of the IAEA as an important step forward;
In the field of security:
36. Points out that, since 1973, the Community and European Political Cooperation have
contributed to the CSCE process and recalls its explicit support for that process;
37. Considers negotiations on more far-reaching confidence-building and security-promoting
measures in Europe to be just as urgent and important as negotiations between the USA and the
USSR on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons systems and expects the European countries
to be more heavily involved therein;
38. Welcomes the INF Agreement signed on 6 December 1987 by the USA and the USSR as
the first commitment to achieve the abolition, with on-the-spot verification, of an entire class of
weapons which were principally designed for use on European territory;
39. Recalls, however, its repeated demands for further disarmament measures in Europe, in
particular
an agreement on short-range nuclear weapons, combined with the abolition of the imbal-
ance in conventional weapons and the achievement of a balance at the lowest possible level
of armament,
a ban on and the destruction of chemical and biological weapons;
40. Regards the offer made by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact
May 1987 on the mutual clarification and adaptation of the military doctrines of the two
alliances as encouraging and believes that its seriousness should be tested by a corresponding
Western proposal;
41. Calls on the Community and its Member States within the Western alliance not to reject
outright or reach defensively to the many security and disarmament policy options put forward
by the Soviet leadership but to test the seriousness of their intentions by presenting practical
counter proposals;
In the field of cooperation on international issues and .with the Third World:
42. Is pleased to note that the Soviet Union has finally begun to withdraw its intervention
troops from Afghanistan in accordance with the timetable agreed under the Geneva Accord of
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43. Welcomes the clearly increased interest of the Soviet Union in taking part in multilateral
cooperation to solve world trade problems, in supporting an active role for the United Nations
in making a contribution to the campaign against hunger and underdevelopment in the world
and in cooperating with the West in the settlement of regional conflicts, such as the war between
Iran and Iraq and in southern Africa;
44. Welcomes the willingness of the Soviet Union, which has hitherto provided hardly any
aid, to cooperate in drafting guidelines for making available for development projects in the
Third World the resources released as a result of disarmament, recalls its positive opinions on a
policy of that nature and calls on the Member States and on European Political Cooperation to
give similar support;
III. As regards the organization of relations
45. Stresses the great importance it attaches to the development of normal and constructive
relations as equal partners between the European Community and the Soviet Union;
46. Takes the view that the basic conditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the Soviet Union and the Community exist;
47. Assumes that the Soviet Union now unconditionally recognizes the reality of the Com-
munity, and that this includes the application of Community law to West Berlin;
48. Calls on the Foreign Ministers of the Community Member States meeting in European
Political Cooperation (EPe) to establish as part of their foreign policy a regular and wide-
ranging political dialogue with the Soviet union on the development of relations and maintain-
ing peace in Europe; considers it appropriate for this dialogue to be held within the same
framework as contacts with other important third countries and groups of states and calls on the
Soviet Union to take up the dialogue at a high political level;
49. Confirms its decision of January 1987 to the effect that, once official relations are
established between the Community and the Soviet Union, it will establish independent rela-
tions with the Supreme Soviet and takes the invitation issued to itsPresident to pay a visit to the
Supreme Soviet as a sign that the latter, too, is interested in such relations;
50. Welcomes the Soviet Union s willingness to hold a detailed exchange of views with the
European Parliament on humanitarian and other issues, in particular in connection with and in
preparation for discussion of human rights issues at the CSCE Conference and calls on its
Bureau to make arrangements for such a dialogue once official relations have been established
with the Supreme Soviet;
51. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the
Foreign Ministers of the Member States meeting in European Political Cooperation and the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the Soviet Union.